(NEWZIMBABWE) Draft constitution fudges devolution
COMMENT - I am all for decentralisation to the local government level, because it increases democratic accountability. However, in the hands of traitors like the MDC, devolution is mere balkanisation, and only puts local elites in charge.Draft constitution fudges devolution
16/02/2012 00:00:00
by Lovemore Fuyane
THE drafters of Zimbabwe’s new constitution are involved in a complex process which is without precedent.
The process began with an odd outreach process where workshops were soon overrun by the political types. Armed only with blank sheets of paper, we are told outreach teams captured every point of view from these sessions and these are now being distilled into constitutional language by a small minority of three drafters.
That is not the end of course. The draft constitution must still be taken through various vetting and consensus building stages, followed by numerous revisions no doubt, and ultimately the envisaged referendum.
That said, I finally received a copy of what has been reported widely as the so called draft constitution which the Constitutional Parliamentary Committee (COPAC) has thus far compiled.
Like all interested Zimbabweans, I also went through it and did indeed note that it is in fact a very rough draft. The first error I picked up on was in the title where it says “Constitution of Zimbabwe” which I presume ought to read “Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe”.
Perusing through the document, one picked up numerous other errors including typos and spelling mistakes. However, the purpose of this article is not to critique the cosmetic issues but rather the substance of what is currently contained in sections of the document and hope that whoever reads this article, including the drafters themselves, takes this in the positive light it is intended.
My first and most important criticism of the documents as it stands, particularly in Chapter 4 “Declaration of Rights” – normally referred to as a Bill of Rights in other constitutions – is that it makes very little attempt to definitively identify and recognise Zimbabwe’s multiple and distinct ethnic and language groups or make their languages official in any shape or form.
While I appreciate that one of the key stated objectives is to foster unity, the truth of the matter is that there is in fact greater unity in diversity. Apart from making vague mention of the need to protect people’s rights to communicate in their chosen language (Chapter 4.13), the document makes no provision or undertaking that the speakers of these languages will be supported by the state in order to promote and grow their identity where they live.
One also does not have any sense that the state will ensure there is equitable access to state resources by geographic location and therefore local demographics in virtually the entire document. Taking a hypothetical example, this may well all mean that a government administrator can still be employed to work in an area where he or she cannot converse in the local language and be perfectly entitled to speak in his own language to the detriment of the local population he is deployed to serve.
The right to belong to an ethnic group is simply not guaranteed in this draft constitution. It does not recognise that certain languages in specific geographic locations can in fact be considered official, neither does it commit the state to support such ethnic identities through appropriate support via the education curriculum, the media or deployment of state resources and administrative employees in support of local demographics.
As far as local employment practices favouring demographics are concerned, the document is completely silent yet all these are rights enshrined in international statutes. Under founding values, the draft refers to “the fostering of national unity, peace, and stability, with due regard to diversity of languages, customary practices and traditions” yet in practice this is really nowhere in the body of the document.
My second and most important concern with the draft document is that as far as it deals with devolution of executive powers, in Chapter 5, it completely fails to define what such devolution entails. It makes no mention of the proposed geographic divisions over which it will apply, how the people administering such devolved divisions will be appointed, whether by direct election or party deployment or via the executive as is the case with the current group of provincial governors.
My reading of the draft is that the drafters have currently left this wide open to parliament to finalise such definitions, completely disregarding the fact that the idea did not originate in parliament but with the people themselves. Why indeed was further input not sought from the source of the idea?
It is partly the failing of the Zimbabwean national parliament that has given rise to the grievances that brought the idea about in the first place. How then can you return this delicate issue to the same house of parliament that has failed to represent the people as far as the issues they want devolution to solve are concerned?
The document goes to great lengths to define the role of the executive, how they will be elected and does exactly the same as far as the national parliament and senate are concerned but when it comes to devolution, it effectively defers this back to parliament via the powers it assigns parliament.
All the various clauses do is explain the need for devolution of the different spheres of government as well as emphasising the power of parliament as far as conflicts may arise in locally promulgated legislation and the constitution. It says that parliament can nullify provincial legislation without making reference to any attempt to resolve disputes amicably in the interests of the affected people. In South Africa this is known as cooperative governance.
It would appear all the drafters did was to mention devolution, then spent the bulk of their time on this chapter emphasising the supremacy of the national parliament over the devolved structures as if this was not already obvious elsewhere.
The drafters commit an entire two sub sections 5.6 and 5.7 dealing with conflict between parliament and the provincial legislature, but make no attempt to define the subordinate structure. In fact it is in these sub-sections that one gets the hint that the devolved structures may well comprise some kind of legislature.
It is well and good that parliament has overriding authority over the provinces, but why not provide a straw-man model of exactly how such provincial governing authorities would come about, or what their powers ought to be so that the people can at least have something to work with and critique?
At the moment I am afraid what the drafters have produced amounts to a reproduction of the simple verbatim words from the outreach calling for devolution. I am certain that as far as the people who called for it are concerned, should they read through the document, they too would likely share my sentiments.
Indeed, there are many other aspects that still require beefing up in the document, many which I have no doubt other commentators will also touch on as we forge ahead.
Let us collectively build a secure, peaceful, economically vibrant and just Zimbabwe that is able to respond to the needs of all its citizens.
Lovemore Fuyane is a Zimbabwean who is resident in South Africa
Labels: CONSTITUTION, DECENTRALIZATION, DEVOLUTION
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