Maravi

(TALKZIMBABWE) Why sanctions on Mugabe are bound to fail

Why sanctions on Mugabe are bound to fail
George Ogola–Opinion
Mon, 21 Jul 2008 00:11:00 +0000

ECONOMIC sanctions are only effective if they are based on the reality of a middle class in society and Zimbabwe which is reeling under basic shortages, lacks such a mass which eventually pushes a regime to embrace reform.

Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe now invites almost automatic revulsion. It therefore seemed inexplicable that a UN draft resolution tailored to punish him and the Harare plutocracy failed because of vetoes by Russia and China. The two countries have since received considerable flak from both Britain and the United States.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has especially been accused of reneging on a commitment during the recent EU summit in which he agreed to endorse financial penalties against Mugabe and his cronies.

Russia argues that Zimbabwe’s conflict is an internal electoral problem which is not within the mandate of the UN Security Council.

Along with China, they also argue that sanctions against Mugabe will scupper South Africa’s mediation efforts.

In response, the UK and the US have noted the millions of Zimbabweans escaping destitution to other Southern Africa countries as a form of destablisation of the region which adds an international dimension to the Zimbabwe problem.

The split within the UN Security Council has played into Zimbabwe’s hands. Mugabe’s foreign minister Sikhanyiso Ndlovu, in what has now become a standard response to international criticism predictably ‘thanked’ Russia, China and South Africa for ‘helping defeat international racism disguised as multilateral action at the UN’.

As the world reels from the defeat of that resolution, it is time to ask the hard questions: Why did the draft resolution collapse? Why did Russia renege on a pre-agreed commitment? Are sanctions ever going to force Mugabe out of office?

Zimbabwe now occupies a very unique position in international politics. The re-emerging chasm between the West and the East coalescing around Russia and China has offered Mugabe a leverage he did not even have to court.

Indeed, it is valid to argue that the vote for and against the UN resolution had very little to do with Zimbabwe. This country is a pawn in a much bigger political conflict.

Clearly, it would be naïve to assume that Russia is unaware of the domino-effect of the Zimbabwe conflict in Southern Africa. It would also be wrong to assume that both Russia and China believe that mediating in internal conflicts in specific countries is outside the mandate of the UN Security Council.

Certainly not after the experiences in Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone and of course Bosnia. Last week, Russia and China were intent on making a political case.

This was Russia’s response to the United State’s plans to build a defence shield in Europe. It was also a statement about the country’s displeasure at the United States’ support of Georgia among other things.

China on the other hand was affirming its position as one building a unique relationship with Africa, a new liaison in which issues regarding internal governance are of secondary importance, if at all. This veto was not about Zimbabwe.

The wider political conflict aside, in light of the defeat of the UN resolution, it would also be useful to re-examine the politics of sanctions against the world’s rogue regimes. Do they work? On occasion, they do. Most times, they don’t.

In cases of failure it is precisely because of the UN’s notable failure to acknowledge the unique social and political formations in various states around the world. The nature of the State in much of the third world for instance is significantly different from the West.

In a State with a large middle class, economic sanctions work because this class often forces the political elite to change its ways or force it out of power because of their symbiotic relationship. In much of the third world, however, the middle class remains merely aspirational, thus economic sanctions have very little chance of success.

Economic sanctions worked against apartheid South Africa because of one fundamental factor; South Africa had a powerful white middle class that forced the regime to change, an argument often conveniently ignored.

Zimbabwe has no such middle class, which fundamentally weakens the sanctions option.

As for targeting the foreign accounts of Harare’s political elite and stopping them from international travels, again therein lies a significant misjudgment.

Aware of the threat of international sanctions, Africa’s political elite have created sub-economies that have become increasingly localized, indeed significantly insulated from international pressures.

What Mugabe and his regime have stashed outside Harare and perhaps Johannesburg may very well be insignificant. Indeed, one only needs to look at Burma where alienation and sanctions against the Burmese junta has not helped topple the regime even after several years.

Writing in the Independent recently Paul Vallely noted that sanctions have always been impotent gestures designed only to quieten demands that something must be done.

Sanctions, smart or otherwise, as currently designed may be premised on flawed assumptions.

Those advocating sanctions must also weigh in the consequences. To argue that the military and the police will turn on Mugabe once he becomes incapable of sustaining them is a gamble we need to avoid if we can.

There are no easy answers to the Zimbabwe conflict, which is why we need a well thought out foreign policy on Mugabe not a ‘feel-good substitute for it’.

*Dr Ogola lectures at the University of Central Lancashire. GOOgola@uclan.ac.uk

[Article first published in Kenya's Business Daily and reproduced here with special permission from the author.]

Labels: MUGABE, SANCTIONS

posted by MrK @ 2:33 AM