Thursday, June 23, 2011

(HERALD) WAFAWAROVA:- Sadc: Zim’s new political battlefiel

WAFAWAROVA:- Sadc: Zim’s new political battlefield
Thursday, 23 June 2011 01:00
Reason Wafawarova

THE June 12 Sadc Summit on Madagascar and Zimbabwe held in Sandton, South Africa, proved to be no more than an expiation venture designed to rebuild the image of the regional body after the highly damaging shortcomings of the March 31 Livingstone Communiqué from the Organ Troika on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.

The Organ Troika in passing Resolution 17 (a) departed from the traditional diplomatic language associated with regional and international summits; and, reportedly at the behest of the evidently excited facilitator on Zimbabwe's political dialogue, Jacob Zuma, misled itself and declared, purely on the basis of hearsay that "there must be an immediate end of violence, intimidation, hate speech, harassment, and any other form of action that contradicts the letter and spirit of the GPA."

In Resolution 16, the same Troika Organ had relied on Zuma's report, itself an exclusive product of a village meeting the facilitator had held with an MDC-T propaganda team that was led by Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai, and purely on the basis of this secret and partisan report, the Organ Troika had "noted with grave concern the polarisation of the political environment as characterised by, inter alia, resurgence of violence, arrests and intimidation in Zimbabwe."

Zanu-PF was totally ambushed on this one, and the facilitator made sure the party had no sight of the report before he tabled it to the Organ Troika. Only the MDC-T knew about the facilitator's report and its contents.

The media made it appear like Zanu-PF was the "offending party" to quote the MDC-T propaganda line, and it was made to appear like the MDC-T is a victim of a monopolised culture of violence inherent in Zanu-PF.

Of course, this was coming at a time the MDC-T membership was witnessing widespread intra-party violence that even Tsvangirai was clearly failing to abate.

Unsurprisingly, the Livingstone allegations set tempers flaring from sections of the political community, especially from Zanu-PF quarters, and suddenly Sadc was turned into a Zimbabwean political battlefield, not the dialogue platform that Thabo Mbeki had worked hard to establish over the years.

The MDC-T found the facilitator's report resonating perfectly well with its propaganda model, and naturally there was raucous celebrations over what was seen to be the fruition of what was called "Tsvangirai's diplomatic offensive", a reference to the MDC-T leader's regional campaign, where he visited most of the Sadc leaders, just ahead of this fated Livingstone Summit.

Political commentary pens spitted gallons of ink on massive newspaper spaces as scribes and political writers sought the real meaning and significance of what had happened in Livingstone.

There were no less than 12 opinion pieces under the Zimpapers stable alone, and one such piece was from the pen of this writer.

There were dozens of other opinion pieces from the private media, and most of these were largely pure rhapsodising and euphoric celebration of what was perceived to be "the end of Zanu-PF and Robert Mugabe".

Sadc itself reportedly saw the Organ Troika's communiqué as having reversed a lot of diplomatic progress that had seen Zimbabwe steadily recovering from a decade-long economic demise; and efforts to control the apparent damage began.

So, a new report had to be put in place in preparation for the coming Namibia Summit, at which the issue of Zimbabwe had to be deferred to a later date, June 12; at a special summit that was eventually held in Sandton, South Africa.

The negotiators from Zimbabwe's three main political parties ran marathon meetings with Zuma's facilitation team and, it appears there were more areas of agreements than those of contention, at least judging from the comments coming from members of the negotiation team itself.

The report produced by this team largely formed the basis of the Sandton Summit communiqué, - a communiqué largely made relevant by the volatile semantic debate between Zanu-PF and the MDC-T over the meanings of words "noted" and "endorsed".

Otherwise Sadc itself seems to have pre-occupied itself with mastering the art of diplomatic communication to the extent that some of the resolutions in this communiqué hardly carry any meaning at all. We will come to that.

The presence of highly vocal political activists from Zimbabwe was clearly noticed during preparations leading to the Sandton Summit, and Sadc had to make sure that its position stood the test this time around.

Sadc was not going to once again reduce itself to the level of rabid political activism over governance issues in Zimbabwe; as had clearly happened in Livingstone.

Dhewa Mavhinga of the so-called Crisis Coalition in Zimbabwe was a very busy man in Sandton, as he was in Livingstone too, in Namibia as well, where he was disappointed to see the "Livingstone war" deferred and also to see the Sadc tribunal campaign blown into smithereens as Sadc effectively sealed any prospect of ever sustaining the bidding of a coalition of Zimbabwean white commercial farmers seeking to reverse the land reform programme through the now defunct Tribunal, the group from whose corner Mavhinga and his gang enjoy a lot of funding.

This writer first met Mavhinga at the University of Zimbabwe in 2000 and there has been quite some interaction since then. In January 2001 Mavhinga was to mark a turning point in this writer's life when he invited this writer to a forum that this writer knew nothing about, and least expected to ever attend.

It was one afternoon when this writer was loitering in the streets of Harare for purposes of spending the day, when Dhewa called and said, "Mukoma Reason where are you?" This writer was heading towards the offices of the Independent newspaper, where the aim was to disturb a lady friend who worked at the reception.

Dhewa said, "Mukoma come kuZanu-PF Headquarters kuThird Floor right now and I will explain everything when you get here."

This writer had never set foot in the yard that carries that building, let alone enter the building itself. Anyone who passed through the University of Zimbabwe in the late nineties and thereafter knows what it meant to be seen entering or exiting that building. But I digress.

To cut a long story short, this writer was in a matter of minutes led to a boardroom by a Mr Mutema and on entering the room, there was Dhewa Mavhinga sitting in what this writer came to know as the Task Force Committee on the Establishment of National Service.

The members of this committee included officials from the Ministry of Youth Development, Gender and Employment Creation, namely Mr David Munyoro, who was then the Director of Youth Development, his two deputies Mr E Mutema and Brigadier Boniface Hurungudo; representatives from various line ministries like Education, Sport and Culture; Higher Education; Health and Child Welfare; Local Government, Rural and Urban Planning; Public Service and Social Welfare, as well as representatives from the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, the likes of Air Commodore Zimondi and other senior ZDF officials, representatives of the Zimbabwe Republic Police, those from the Zimbabwe Prison Services.

Dhewa was introduced as being the "representative of students in Zimbabwe", regardless that he had by that time completed his term as president of the Student Union. He was still a student though.

The Chairperson then flattered this writer when he went on to say Dhewa had told the Task Force Committee that this writer would be "a vital person to this committee". Deliberations began.

At the end of the meeting this writer had successfully pushed for the altering of "National Service" to "National Youth Service" and he had been chosen the "facilitator for all coming meetings" beginning with the 2001 February 28 to March 3 All Stake Holder Conference that was held at the Great Zimbabwe Inn in Masvingo. That marked the beginning of this writer's involvement with the National Youth Service Programme.

It was after this conference that this writer was approached to join the Ministry of Youth Development, Gender and Employment Creation as an Administrative Officer in the NYS section, together with two other colleagues, one coming in as an ex-officer for the same programme when it was initially embarked on by the same Ministry in the nineties, and another as an ex-Ministry of Local Government employee.

That marked the beginning of the popular National Youth Service Programme - popular with youths from across Zimbabwe, albeit for its attractive packages after graduation, much as it attracted a lot of attacks from those that perceived it as Zanu-PF's way of winning back the youth, particularly those from the urban areas.

Today, Mavhinga may rightfully or wrongly condemn the NYS programme for what he expected it to become and what he thinks it finally became, just like some of us differed with parts of the implementation process of this otherwise very noble national programme.

But, Dhewa cannot pretend that he cannot stand personnel from the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, and that they are anathema he has never had anything to do with, that they are incapable of progressive thinking and national development - the very issues he was preaching against Zimbabwe's security forces in Sandton.

But, this was a digression, if only to narrate a relevant past. Mavhinga's team of pro-MDC-T political activists that styled itself as "members of the civic society" soon discovered that Zanu-PF had woken up to the game of bussing activists to regional political forums and each of his meetings had counter-arguments thrown all over the place. For once, Zanu-PF matched the MDC-T's idea of democracy and free speech - that is playing the politics of spoilers.

When Mavhinga and his gang finally carried out what he told those who cared to follow the circus in Sandton was a "March for Justice", he unwittingly mistook the secessionist Mthwakazi Liberation Front for fellow Western tools, and the march was reduced to fist fights and tribal primitiveness, right in front of some of the people that Dhewa and his handlers had wanted to impress by masquerading as highly civilised and pro-democracy citizens, at least for the cameras.

My dictionary defines to "endorse" as "to write on the back of, as one's name on a bill, to approve, or to ratify".

It defines "note" as mark, signal, to observe carefully, to mark". In Resolution 18, the Livingstone Troika Summit "endorsed the report of the Sadc facilitator on Zimbabwe."

This was quite unambiguous and as such there was no semantic debate at all. Effectively the Troika ratified whatever report the facilitator had submitted to it, albeit in an erroneous manner.

Jameson Timba seems to think the ratification of Zuma's report by the Organ Troika is the same as ratification by Sadc itself. So, he argues that the same report was "endorsed" at Sandton, accusing all those who do not agree with this position of lying. But Timba is known to this writer as someone who easily can talk under the influence of insanity.

After Sandton the MDC-T and Zanu-PF were fighting profusely over whether the same ratification of the Livingstone Summit had been repeated at Sandton or not, with Zanu-PF celebrating that "noted" meant that the report had "not been endorsed", which is semantically and practically correct.

The MDC-T decided to go into overdrive celebrations declaring that "noted" meant the same thing as "endorsed", something that can only be backed by political posturing and not by logic of semantics or linguistics.

The Sandton Summit "noted" three developments on Zimbabwe. First the Summit "noted the report" of Jacob Zuma "on the progress made in the implementation of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in Zimbabwe, ‘noting' consultations held with the stakeholders in Zimbabwe on the implementation of the outstanding issues on the GPA."

This "noting" is about the damage control report that Zuma had to do after the heated attacks he received in the aftermath of Livingstone. More importantly for Zanu-PF and the MDC now led by Welshman Ncube, this report was not as strange as the one presented only to the Organ Troika and to nobody else in Livingstone - one that only had familiarity with Tsvangirai's MDC-T.

But, what does it mean when Sadc says it "noted" this report and its preceding consultations? Does it mean it "endorsed" this report or it simply "observed carefully" to borrow from my dictionary?

Then, the Summit "noted" the decisions of the Organ Troika held in Livingstone in Resolution 22. This has been the political battlefield over which Zanu-PF and the MDC-T have been both celebrating over completely different, if not opposite causes. One would be forgiven for thinking that this was the only resolution where the word "noted" was used. But it clearly was not.

One sure victory for Zanu-PF at Sandton was the total disappearance of the combative, undiplomatic and highly politicised language that was used at the Livingstone Summit, especially in the Communiqué.

This time there were no baseless accusations based on propaganda lines, no rhetorical ultimatums and no vaingloriously threatening language that could only add to the "polarisation" that the Organ Troika itself said it sought to end.

On the other hand, the use of such unprofessional and polarising language had been hailed, and continues to be hailed as victory by the MDC-T leadership, showing exactly who is responsible for the polarity of Zimbabweans politically, even for promoting the so-called hate language.

Thirdly, the Sandton Summit "noted" the report received from a Sadc team dispatched on a mission to lobby the UK, the US and the EU for the lifting of sanctions against Zimbabwe. No debate at all over the word "noted" in this case.

Subsequent to this "noting", the Summit "committed to continue dialogue with the Western powers on the removal of sanctions against Zimbabwe."

While the Livingstone report was clearly the MDC-T's pre-occupation in the lead- up to the Sandton Summit, Zanu-PF was strongly pushing for a more emphatic push on the issue of the lifting of the illegal sanctions imposed on the country by the West effectively since 1997, but officially since 2001.

The MDC-T leadership does not only refuse to call for the lifting of these sanctions, but is also quite committed in promoting the same sanctions, urging their perpetuation "until change comes", by which they mean their own ascension to political power. There is hardly any veiling to this campaign.

The call for the lifting of sanctions was fully endorsed by Sadc as a full Summit in August 2010. That was in Windhoek, Namibia. What is in progress now is the implementation of that endorsed position.

What the Sandton Summit "noted" was not the call for the lifting of sanctions. Rather it "noted" the report coming from the implementing team that visited Western capitals to call for the lifting of the sanctions.

On the other hand, what the Sandton Summit "noted" about Livingstone was a report that had been "endorsed" by the Organ Troika in Livingstone.

There is simply no resolve for Sadc itself to implement the report from Livingstone, save for the decision to mandate the Organ Troika to "appoint their representatives as soon as possible to participate in the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (Jomic)."

It is highly unlikely that the Livingstone report will find its way in the work of Jomic, or in the terms of reference to be followed by the Troika's representatives.

It would appear the negotiators' report that was "noted" in Sandton is to be the guide in future deliberations over the direction towards the next elections in Zimbabwe. This is simply because there is no possibility whatsoever that Zanu-PF will be party to any attempt to implement the circus that happened in Livingstone.

However, much is going to depend on Resolution 25 from Sandton. Here the Summit "mandated the Secretariat to mobilise resources for Jomic for it to discharge its functions". It does not take rocket science to guess who is going to be offering such resources. Whenever resource mobilisation is mentioned, the African psyche unfortunately tunes towards the West.

We are more than likely to see a wave of lobbying by money wielding Western sponsored organisations so Jomic can revive the mood of Livingstone, itself a highly polarising phenomenon that could easily derail the GPA progress achieved so far into untold chaos. For the West chaos sells at the moment. What, with Libyan chaos providing the cover they want in the use of brute force in achieving evil imperialist goals.

Zanu-PF views "full implementation of the GPA" as comprising of completing the constitution making process and carrying out a referendum, followed by an election either late this year or early 2011.
The MDC-T is avoiding commitment towards the constitution making process after their Western oriented input largely failed to find its way into the adopted positions for the draft. Efforts to smuggle these inputs are still being pursued at the drafting stage and Zanu-PF has to watch out on this one.

So, the MDC-T leadership considers "full implementation of the GPA" to mean restaffing of polling personnel, especially those at the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. It also means to them reshuffling personnel in the security sector, especially the leadership of the Police Force and the Zimbabwe Defence Forces.

This is despite the fact that these proposals hardly appear in the GPA; here "hardly appear" being this writer's polite way of saying the GPA has nothing to do with any of these proposals. Sadc may need to set clear bench marks over what it means by "full implementation of the GPA" and these benchmarks may necessarily need to be passed on to the facilitator; who clearly is not as consistent as his predecessor, both in carrying out his duties at regional level and also at the continental level.

His facilitation skills are also highly questionable. Cde Zuma must have felt embarrassed when speaker after speaker, Absolom Sikhosana included - repeatedly condemned the Western brutalities in Libya at the ANC Youth League Congress recently held in South Africa.

It certainly must have tormented Zuma's conscience after he unwittingly voted for the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 that the West is wielding in its wrongful interpretation of the phrase "no-fly zone". Malema has publicly said Mandela could never do such a thing and he has repeatedly condemned Zuma for this "lack of leadership". Zuma has protested over the implementation of Resolution 1973, but his vote is being paraded as the African voice in support of the bombing of Libyans.

Zimbabwe we are one and together we will overcome. It is homeland or death!

Reason Wafawarova is a political writer and can be contacted on
reason@rwafawarova.com
wafawarova@yahoo.co.uk
www.rwafawarova.com


Labels: , , ,

0 Comments:

Post a Comment

Subscribe to Post Comments [Atom]

<< Home