Challenging Western Distortions about Zimbabwe's Land Reform
By Gregory Elich
02-25-11
Mugabe; U.S. Public Enemy Number 1 since land reform launched
For years, Western journalists have castigated Zimbabwe's land reform program. From afar, they pronounced land reform a failure for having brought about the total collapse of agriculture and plunging the nation into chronic food insecurity.
Redistributed land, we are continually told, went to cronies with political connections, while ordinary people were almost entirely excluded from the process. Farmland went to ruin because of the incompetence of the new owners. These were simple messages, drilled into the minds of the Western public through repetition. For Western reporters, certain that they owned the truth, emotion substituted for evidence. Those of a more curious frame of mind, however, were left to wonder what conditions were like in the field, where no reporter bothered to venture.
Now this gaping lacuna has been filled by two recent studies. In a report issued just over a year ago, the African Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS) details the results of its extensive field investigations conducted in six districts from 2005 to 2006.(1) The other field study was done in Masvingo Province beginning in 2006 by the Livelihoods after Land Reform project, with multinational assistance, including that of the Great Britain-based Institute of Development Studies (IDS). (2)
What both studies found was that the facts on the ground were at variance with popular Western perceptions. As the IDS study noted, "Those of us exposed regularly to the international, especially British, media found it hard to match what we heard on the TV and radio and read in the newspapers with what we were finding on the ground."
There were a number of misperceptions, which in large part the team felt were due to "a simple lack of solid, field-level data." (3) Although it is true that there has been such a lack, this factor alone does not account for the inaccuracy of Western news reports. The ideological factor is paramount, as always. For that reason, even though concrete information is now available, the tone of Western reports is unlikely to change.
It can never be stressed enough that Zimbabwe inherited a highly unequal land ownership pattern from apartheid Rhodesia. By 2002, 70 percent of the richest farmland still remained in the hands of just 4,500 white commercial farmers, focused mainly on producing crops for export. Meanwhile, one million indigenous families eked out a bare existence, crowded into an arid region of limited suitability for agriculture, known as the 'communal' areas. Fast-track land reform redistributed much of the commercial farmland to some 170,000 families. Whatever its faults in execution, the process has undeniably created a significantly more equitable distribution of land than what prevailed before.
Labels: BBC, GREG ELICH, LAND REFORM, MEDIA
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Land reform: Debunking Western distortions
Thursday, 03 March 2011 20:57
By Gregory Elich
FOR years, western journalists have castigated Zimbabwe's land reform programme.
From afar, they pronounced land reform a failure for having brought about the total collapse of agriculture and plunging the nation into chronic food insecurity.
Redistributed land, we are continually told, went to cronies with political connections, while ordinary people were almost entirely excluded from the process.
Farmland went to ruin because of the incompetence of the new owners. These were simple messages, drilled into the minds of the western public through repetition. For western reporters, certain that they owned the truth,
emotion substituted for evidence.
Those of a more curious frame of mind, however, were left to wonder what conditions were like in the field, where no reporter bothered to venture.
Now this gaping lacuna has been filled by two recent studies. In a report issued just over a year ago, the African Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS) details the results of its extensive field investigations conducted in six districts from 2005 to 2006.
The other field study was done in Masvingo province beginning in 2006 by the Livelihoods after Land Reform project, with multinational assistance, including that of the Great Britain-based Institute of Development Studies (IDS).
What both studies found was that the facts on the ground were at variance with popular western perceptions. As the IDS study noted, "Those of us exposed regularly to the international, especially British, media found it hard to match what we heard on the TV and radio and read in the newspapers with what we were finding on the ground".
There were a number of misperceptions, which in large part the team felt were due to "a simple lack of solid, field-level data". Although it is true that there has been such a lack, this factor alone does not account for the inaccuracy of western news reports.
The ideological factor is paramount, as always. For that reason, even though concrete information is now available, the tone of western reports is unlikely to change. It can never be stressed enough that Zimbabwe inherited a highly unequal land ownership pattern from apartheid Rhodesia.
By 2002, 70 percent of the richest farmland still remained in the hands of just 4 500 white commercial farmers, focused mainly on producing crops for export.
Meanwhile, one million indigenous families eked out a bare existence, crowded into an arid region of limited suitability for agriculture, known as the "communal" areas. Fast-track land reform redistributed much of the commercial farmland to some 170 000 families.
Whatever its faults in execution, the process has undeniably created a significantly more equitable distribution of land than what prevailed before.
That is not the story the western audience hears. Instead, we are told that fast track land reform was a "land grab" by "cronies," bringing about a more unequal distribution of land than what had preceded it.
Yet the surveys conducted by the AIAS and the IDS found that most beneficiaries of land reform were ordinary people, whereas those who might be categorised as "elites" constituted a small minority. According to the IDS, this minority amounted to less than five percent.
But it does leave open the question of how one determines who an "elite" is and who is not. That one works for the Government does not in itself mean that one is an "elite" or a "crony," nor that one has necessarily ignored the application process and simply bullied one's way into being granted land. Such cases did occur, but they hardly constitute the typical experience of resettled farmers.
"That some of the beneficiaries are ‘elites' is undisputed,"notes the AIAS.
"What is in dispute is their character and the extent of their benefit. The tendency to generalise the notion of an ‘elite' leaves unexplained the social content of the concept, and assumes that it lacks differentiation in a dynamic process of class formation."
Government job holders, war veterans and Zanu-PF members are lumped together with high ranking officials as "elites," or "cronies".
It is assumed that all bypassed the land application process in order to seize land.
The AIAS points out that the empirical evidence shows "a more differentiated pattern". This finding is confirmed by the IDS team: "The composition of land reform beneficiaries is highly varied. The claim that the land reform was dominated by politically well-connected ‘cronies' is simply untrue.
"Nor are war veterans a dominant group. Although many took leadership roles during the land invasions, the majority came from rural backgrounds where they had been farming in the communal areas.
"While some civil servants and business people are members of the elite, many are not. Teachers, extension workers and small-scale entrepreneurs have joined the land reform, adding new skills and capacities. And farm workers too have been important beneficiaries."
There were two resettlement schemes implemented during fast track land reform: the A1 model, in which small farms intended to benefit the landless or disadvantaged were allocated, and the A2 model, which were larger farms that were expected to be more immediately productive.
The AIAS found that most of the beneficiaries of land reform came from the communal areas, about 62 percent. Other ordinary people accounted for the majority of the remaining percentage.
Applicants for A2 farms "were required to submit a business development plan and a proof of capacity to finance farm operations".
For this reason urban residents unsurprisingly accounted for a far higher percentage of applicants for A2 farms than they did for A1 farms. Still, even in the A2 farms they rank second to communal farmers.
Despite a lack of infrastructure, beneficiaries were quick to take up farming operations. For instance, nearly 72 percent of those allocated land in 2002, the peak year of land resettlement, began operations that same year.
This, despite resistance by evicted commercial landowners, and the refusal of many of them to vacate the land.
By 2003, the percentage of these resettled farmers that had begun farming had risen to almost 96 percent, a far cry from the popular image of land going to waste.
Agricultural productivity, we are so often told, has been dismal since the launch of fast track land reform. The not always unstated implication of western reports is that the land would have been best left in the hands of the few wealthy commercial landowners, as only they were capable of producing bountiful outputs.
That view is a manifestation of the free market philosophy that is so comforting to the entitled: that the greatest good should go to the privileged few.
From that vantage point, the many who suffer the consequences of an extreme and narrow concentration of wealth are deemed unworthy of consideration.
There has indeed been a decline in agricultural production in recent years, although for varied and complex reasons.
Certainly one of the key factors responsible for the decline is that Zimbabwe's entire economy has shrunk by around 40 percent since the year 2000.
By abandoning the destructive western-initiated structural adjustment program, and then by accelerating land reform efforts in order to achieve a more equitable distribution of land, Zimbabwe triggered western hostility.
Neo-liberal sensitivities were offended, and punishment was not long in coming.
By late 2001, president George W Bush signed into law the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, which instructed US officials in international financial institutions to "oppose and vote against any extension by the respective institution of any loan, credit, or guarantee to the government of Zimbabwe".
The US wields enormous influence in the decisions of the IMF, World Bank and other international financial institutions. Great Britain and other western countries were of like mind, and Zimbabwe found itself shut out of the kind of normal credit operations that are essential for any modern economy to operate.
Western meddling did not stop there, and the net effect was to cause the Zimbabwean economy to take a nosedive, a trend which unavoidably had an adverse impact on agricultural operations.
Agriculture does not exist in isolation. In myriad ways it is interrelated to the general economy, and it cannot remain unperturbed by a deep economic downturn.
For all of their expressed concern for Zimbabwe's agricultural productivity, western leaders must bear a major portion of the responsibility for its decline.
But then, that is what sanctions are intended to do: sow economic ruin in the target nation.
Another not insignificant factor in the decline of crop production is that much of the region in which Zimbabwe is situated is especially susceptible to the effects of climate change, and over the last decade there has been a sharp increase in the frequency of major drought conditions. According to the AIAS, "the period from 2001-2005 was characterised by poor rainfall distribution, the worst in the post-independence period".
As this chart illustrates, rainfall and agricultural production in Zimbabwe track quite closely. Maize is measured in the chart, as this is the staple crop in Zimbabwe. (Source: Sam Moyo presentation - "Zimbabwe's Agrarian Reform and Prospects for Recovery".
The drought in the 2007-8 agricultural season was particularly nasty, and national maize output plummeted to 470 000 metric tonnes.
Yet in the following season, the nation enjoyed good rainfall and as a result more than two and a half times as much maize was produced.
It is impossible to consider the correlation between rainfall and agricultural output and then continue, as western reports do, insist on its irrelevance.
In Masvingo province, the area the IDS studied, the "production since settlement, for all farmers outside the irrigated plots, has been highly dependent on the pattern of rainfall, and the droughts in many of the seasons since 2000 had a huge impact on people's ability to establish themselves.
"By contrast, the good rainfall years resulted in substantial harvests and were vitally important in the pattern of accumulation, allowing for the purchase of new inputs, equipment and livestock".
Western media have distorted the pre-land reform picture as well. Contrary to the rosy picture painted of the apartheid-era inherited land ownership pattern, most commercial farms focused on export crops such as tobacco, while the bulk of food for domestic use was grown by communal farmers.
In more than half of the years in the two decades preceding fast track land reform, Zimbabwe needed to import food. It is simply untrue that the import of food is a new development in Zimbabwe's history.
It is inaccurate to attribute a drop in agricultural production entirely to resettled farmers. The "pattern of low yields based on inputs' constraints," the AIAS reports, "also affected communal area farmers . . . Indeed, a large proportion of the marketed maize and cotton in recent years is found to have originated from the newly resettled areas".
The evidence in the AIAS survey, as well as according to the views of farmers and extension workers, "is that yields have declined mainly because of the shortages of (and failure to access) inputs" by new farmers due to inadequate credit and personal savings.
[Personal savings in Zimbabwe Dollars would have been destroyed by the hyperinflation caused by ZDERA. - MrK]
"Yields were also affected by frequent bouts of inclement weather."
The shortage of draft power, too, "is a key constraint to timely and adequate ploughing".
Historically, the success of any land reform effort depends on the support new farmers are given. Adequate agricultural inputs are essential.
Unfortunately, Zimbabwe has had to deal with some daunting challenges in that regard.
The AIAS found that less than half of the farmers it surveyed relied on inorganic fertiliser, production of which has sharply declined in the nation.
"Fertiliser and agro-chemicals use have been most affected because they require some imported content yet foreign currency resources have been scarce."
And the supply of foreign currency is low due to western sanctions. As the IDS study points out, other factors include "frequent plant and machinery breakdowns and power cuts, and the reduced capacity of the National Railways of Zimbabwe, leading to increased costs of moving raw materials from mines and ports by road".
Sanctions have reduced Zimbabwe's access to spare parts to keep machinery running, and the poor supply of foreign currency limits the amount of electrical power that can be imported from neighbouring countries.
Furthermore, the AIAS notes, "the majority of the new farmers are resource-constrained and thus cannot afford to meet their input requirements from the market even when the inputs are available".
Prior to the fast track land reform process, large commercial farms received strong credit line support from both state and private financial institutions, while nearly all smallholders lacked such support.
After fast track land reform, most of the private financial companies withdrew altogether from offering credit to farmers.
Only two percent of resettled farmers "benefited from private sector crop input schemes and none were beneficiaries for livestock programmes".
Financial support for the burgeoning number of farmers fell to the state, which was ill equipped to meet the need, with its financial resources stretched to the breaking point by economic sanctions.
As a result, only a small percentage of resettled farmers were able to benefit from adequate credit support, compelling most of them to rely on their own savings to manage.
International NGOs for the most part refused to provide any services to resettled farmers, and focused their efforts elsewhere.
Relying for their funding on western governments hostile to the land reform process, NGOs were loath to support the beneficiaries of a process they preferred to see fail. Less than three percent of resettled farmers in the AIAS study sample received extension support from NGOs.
"Input assistance from NGOs was even lower with 1,7 percent of the beneficiaries having received such support." AIAS interviews with NGO officials revealed that the organisations were opposed to operating in resettled areas because they regarded land reform as illegitimate.
These humanitarian organisations, it seems, were much happier with the old system, in which the many suffered hunger and privation while the wealthy few thrived.
And yet, despite all obstacles, many resettled farmers have managed to prosper. According to the IDS study, "impressive investments have been made in clearing the land, in livestock, in equipment, in transport and in housing".
Indeed, the IDS argues, "the scale of investment carried out by people themselves, and without significant support from Government or aid agencies, is substantial, and provides firm foundations for the future".
"Cattle holdings have a direct impact on crop production", notes the IDS study, and "the value of draft power, transport and manure is substantial".
In the IDS study sample, herd sizes in the resettled areas have grown, while households without cattle have declined.
One of the primary goals of land reform in Zimbabwe was poverty alleviation, a deeply unpopular concept in the US and Great Britain, but one that still means something in much of the rest of the world.
While not every farmer is succeeding, the majority of resettled farmers have experienced real change in their lives.
As one farmer explained, "We are happier here at the resettlement.There is more land, plots are larger and there is no overcrowding. Last season I got very good yields, and filled two granaries with sorghum.
"Following resettlement, there is now a future for my family, and my sons will have land".
Another man had "little land to farm" prior to resettlement, and relied for help from his relatives in order to survive.
He and his wife have managed to clear four hectares on their new farm. "Before I had no cattle", he said, "but now I own five , all purchased through farming. I have also managed to buy a plough".
[For some context. A 250kg beef cow can be sold in the US for $1250,-. In theory, 5 cows would represent a cash value of $6250,-. A major difference in a country where most people earn $1 per day or $365 per year. - MrK]
In a turnaround, no longer needing support from his family, it is he who helps family members back in the communal areas during periods of drought, and sends cash to pay for his young brothers' school fees.
"The new land has transformed our lives", he remarks. According to another farmer, "Life has changed remarkably for me because I have more land and can produce more than I used to".
These are typical comments from resettled farmers.
Labels: GREG ELICH, LAND REFORM
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What free trade is doing to Africa!
Christian Aid calculates that over the past two decades, sub-Saharan Africa has lost $272bn from the effects of trade liberalisation. That money did not vanish. It was transferred to wealthy corporate pockets in the developed nations. It is worth noting that none of the developed nations achieved their economic status through free trade policies. Protectionist measures were essential for evelopment, reports Gregory Elich.
So often we are told that the free market is the path to economic prosperity. All an impoverished nation needs to do is privatise, deregulate, reduce the size and role of government, cut tariff protections and open its economy to foreign investors, and it too can become a developed model economy. This gospel is preached by the US and Western European nations and enforced through international financial institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
The neoliberal economic model, it is claimed, is beneficial for all nations and in all circumstances. But is it true? These assertions never acknowledge the actual experience of developing nations that implement these policies. To do so would dispel such notions. The effect of free trade on agricultural development in sub-Saharan Africa provides a characteristic example.
Ghana faithfully enacted structural adjustment programmes in the 1990s in accordance with agreements it had signed with the IMF and World Bank. Subsidies to farmers were ended and the state-run seed company was closed down. The removal of subsidies caused the price of fertiliser to skyrocket, with a predictable fall in consumption and its consequent effect on agricultural production levels.
Government programmes that actively supported farmers were ended, and loans by commercial banks to agricultural producers nearly dried up. Import tariffs were dramatically reduced and in many cases eliminated altogether. This led to a flood of cheap imports from abroad. Domestic smallholders were compelled to compete with imports from subsidised large-scale Western agribusinesses.
In the US, Western Europe and Japan, many billions of dollars are provided to rice growers each year, allowing them to set an export price at well below the cost of production. Local growers in sub-Saharan Africa simply cannot compete on equal terms, especially as they must manage without subsidies due to IMF/World Bank strictures. Such “free market competition” has brought only hardship to Ghanaian farmers. Surveys in 2002 and 2004 found that two-thirds of rice growers in Ghana operated at a loss. “Why are we suffering?”, a Ghanaian farmer asked. “Maybe the international lenders want us to be totally dependent on them.”
Heavily subsidised tomato paste imports from the US and Western Europe into Ghana increased by more than five times in the decade ending in 2002. The wholesale closure of domestic tomato processing plants and storage facilities resulted, hampering the prospects of success for growers. On top of that, many plants were forced to shut down due to IMF-imposed structural adjustment plans. Offered for privatisation, these plants in many cases found no buyers, and thus had to cease operations in accordance with neoliberal principles. One farmer commented on the local cannery in his area, which had “made things easier for us”. But now it is closed. As a state-run firm, it was no longer allowed to operate without a buyer. “Selling our tomatoes is a game of chance,” he said. “It’s heartbreaking to stand here and watch the fruit go rotten.”
Not surprisingly, given such factors, imports now account for 90% of the tomato paste sold in Ghana, leading the King of Asante, Otumfuo Osei Tutu II to comment recently: “We used to grow enough tomatoes here for our needs. We even used to have a tomato-canning factory in the north [of the country]! Today we import tomato paste from wherever, why? Why are we importing everything? You cannot be a mighty country or continent lying in bed and importing everything.” In Senegal, import levels of tomato paste have increased by a factor of 15 times, leading to a halving of local production. Throughout sub-Saharan Africa similar patterns are developing.
Labels: GREG ELICH, NEOLIBERALISM
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Reclaiming the Land: Land Reform and Agricultural Development in Zimbabwe:
An Interview with Sam Moyo
by Gregory Elich
Amid the economic crisis in Zimbabwe, the agricultural sector continues to struggle. Although the plunge in agricultural output over the last few years has often been commented on in the Western media, little or no attention is paid to the complex factors contributing to that decline.
Instead, matters are reduced to a simple generalization. It is rare to be presented with information from someone with direct involvement with the agricultural sector in Zimbabwe. Sam Moyo has over 25 years of research experience in rural development issues, and his organization has conducted studies and analyses and provided policy recommendations on land policy.
Highly respected in his profession, Moyo is uniquely positioned to offer an evidence-based overview of the situation.
Elich: You are the Executive Director of the African Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS). What is the aim of your organization and what is its role in supporting agricultural development in the continent?
Moyo: The aim of AIAS is to work with key actors throughout Africa to enhance the capacity to develop and implement equitable agrarian policies and to promote sustainable land use in support of marginalized groups by undertaking research, policy analysis, training, and dialogue.
The role is to mediate in the policy making process, so as to enhance rural livelihoods through an improved policy framework. In its work, the Institute interacts with and provides policy advice and capacity support to various stakeholders, who include governments, regional bodies, universities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) researchers, students, and the donor community.
Elich: Although much has been written in the West about agriculture in your home country of Zimbabwe, reports tend to be heavy on emotion and light on concrete information. You and your organization continue to play an important role in the study and development of agriculture in Zimbabwe through research, analysis, and policy recommendations. You are well qualified to fill the information gap for a Western audience, so I would like to focus on that topic for this interview.
Let's start by discussing land reform. There was a market-based land reform in place before Zimbabwe embarked upon a more radical program. Why was this path chosen? The popular attitude in the West is that the land was best left in the hands of the few white commercial farmers.
Moyo: The market-based approach was sensu stricto the only approach followed between 1980 and 1992, for the following reasons.
The market approach was a result of the Lancaster House constitution, which emphasized that approach, and allowed for expropriation (for specific public purposes) under stringent and costly conditions. The latter included full market pricing of compensation, and in a forex (foreign exchange) currency of the choice of the landholder. This constitutional clause could not be altered until 1990. At the Lancaster negotiation, Western funding of the market-based process was promised by the key brokers of the settlement (UK and USA). The UK provided significant funds for this (44 million pounds), particularly up to 1989, and this was co-financed with the GoZ (Government of Zimbabwe) to secure 3 million hectares out of the 15 million hectares held by large farmers; but the USA did not fund land. The policy (concept) of 'reconciliation' (racial and political) was assumed to lead to a spirit of land sharing through negotiated transfer. But racial polarization and land and wealth concentration continued instead. Some GoZ technocrats believed the market would deliver more land (but this was not to be, as mainly abandoned and marginal land was sold) at reasonable prices (again not to be), and there was limited access to capital for state and private purchase within the broader social reform program.
The radical approach to land reform was initiated in terms of the constitution, land laws, and the policy framework during 1990 and 1992 and was implemented as follows. A small-scale attempt at land expropriation in 1993 (30 farms) and 1995 (100 farms) was largely defeated by landholder litigations.
These processes fueled an increased hostility between landholders, whites, and business on the one hand, and blacks in general, government, war veterans, and the landless on the other hand.
Antagonism between the UK and Zimbabwe governments over a new phase of funded land reform emerged, with failure to agree to the new program which had been agreed by UK's John Major. An effort to get large land holders and government to agree to land transfers through joint identification of land for transfer was started in 1995, but this ended in disagreements, leading to the GoZ producing its own list of 1,700 farms to be designated for expropriation. There was a refusal by the Blair government in 1997 to honor the Conservative government's proposal of 1996, and broader confrontations between the GoZ and international donors over the failed ESAP (Economic Structural Adjustment Program) led to failure in 1996 to sign a new ESAP (called ZIMPREST).
Other factors driving the radical approach were internal 'rebellion' by war veterans within ZANU-PF demanding compensation for war losses and pensions, as well as impatience over access to 20% of the land to be redistributed; expansion of the indigenous (nationalist) bourgeoisie who also sought land; greater landlessness and urban retrenchees seeking land in rural areas, and their resort to scattered "illegal" land occupations; the designation of 1,471 farms (4 million hectares) for expropriation in 1997, and the 'defeat' of this effort by large farmer litigations in 1997 and 1998; and the mobilization by war veterans, with rural leaders (traditional leaders/chiefs; spirit mediums; other rural war veterans and some landless people) in areas already mobilized over land grievances, towards land occupations in 30 sites throughout Zimbabwe by 1998.
There was also a general political radicalization of ZANU-PF and nationalists over reforms in Zimbabwe in view of the resurgence of white farmer and business political mobilization against land reform and in support of a new political opposition party (the MDC). Heightened political polarization emerged from Western criticism and withholding of loans/aid, while supporting the MDC and embedded NGOs, beginning with the constitutional Reform process (1999-2000) and in subsequent elections. The failure of the 1998 donor conference to deliver land and/or funding for a market-based reform also contributed. The radical land reform process was further entrenched during 2000 and 2003, due to intense political conflict and electoral contests over land reform, including further grievances emerging from the imposition of sanctions on and the isolation of Zimbabwe.
As for the Western attitude that the land should have been left to whites, this belief is also held by some in the middle and capitalist classes in Zimbabwe too. But this has been unfounded and rejected by nationalists and peasants because past policies favored large farmers and support to new farmers was minimal. Banks and agribusiness were tied into the large farming system and international support to small black farmers was minimal. Access to good land infrastructure was not balanced to black farmers. Moreover the white farmers increasingly produced less of the food needs of the majority, while income concentration perpetuated an imbalanced home market and consumption.
Elich: In the context of domestic political polarization, Western interference, and the imposition of sanctions, fast-track land reform could hardly have had more inauspicious circumstances for its launch. Historically on the world scene, the success of land reform efforts have hinged to a significant degree on the ability to supply sufficient inputs (loans, tools, fertilizer, training) to resettled farmers. But access to foreign exchange has been severely constrained by Western sanctions. Zimbabwe has also had unfavorable climatic conditions in recent years.
None of this gets much mention in Western media. Instead it is pointed out that agricultural output was bountiful when most of the best land was in the hands of white commercial farmers, but since fast-track land reform the government has had to import food to avert starvation. It is implied that black farmers are incompetent or ineffective and that the land did better when it was held in so-called "capable" hands.
You've closely studied agricultural production in Zimbabwe. What are your thoughts on the reasons for the decline in food production and the Western perception of that?
Moyo: This question is complex and needs a nuanced response.
To begin with, close to 70% of the food consumed by the 80% of Zimbabweans who are the working classes (peasants, formal and informal wage workers, the unemployed) and over 50% of the middle class foods, which comprise mainly grains (maize, sorghum, groundnuts and pulses as oils or for direct eating) and local relish (greens) have always been produced by the peasants and urban residents' gardens. Apart from feeding themselves (65% of the population), the peasants sold over 70% of the marketed grain and groundnuts and the little locally produced rice (over 90% of which was always imported). Secondly, peasants provided most indigenous fruits (Mazhanje, Masawi, etc.), as well as most of the meat and milk consumed in rural areas.
True, large white farmers produced and sold most of the higher protein-value, largely urban-consumed, foods: milk and dairy products; wheat; temperate fruits and jams (apples, oranges, etc.), tea and coffee, sugar, meat (beef, poultry, and pork products), and oils and fats (from soya beans, sunflower, and so forth). The middle and upper urban-based classes consumed most of this LSCF (Large-Scale Commercial Farm) production.
However, most of the poor urban working class transferred money to peasant producers, who kept some for their family members and supplied them with part of their food. There was a clear division of production between peasants and large farmers, with the former producing most of the cheaper and bulkier foods, and the latter producing the rest of the foods, much of which was consumed by a few people.
Moreover, by far the largest outputs (in volumes and value) produced by large farmers were destined for exports (tobacco, sugar, tea, coffee, horticulture, beef, etc.) and for the local industry (soaps, etc.). Although their exports were critical for forex (40% of national forex was from agriculture, but peasants produced 80% of the cotton and its attendant forex), they were not the main supplier of the food consumed by most of the population, who could not afford their products.
These are the social and structural facts of the previous unequal income and consumption situation.
However, we must still explain why the bulky low-income foods are in short supply (maize especially)! Well, it is mainly because of the decline in seed and fertilizer supply, and reduced private and external financing. During the last eight years the country also experienced four substantial droughts, with signs of climatic change or higher variability in rainfall. The previous season was one such year, coupled with extremely low input supplies. This trend has led to reduced rain-fed maize production by the peasantry, as 90% of the irrigation resources were and are still held by large farmers, including the sugar estates. Peasants have thus experienced a loss of their own seed and cash resources, which has undermined their production cycle. Various other constraints have been experienced in a context of economic decline and sanctions: fuel shortages and high global prices affected the transport and plowing processes; electricity shortages limiting irrigation and fertilizer production processes; and reduced government revenues limiting state support to peasants, and so forth. This occurred in the face of limited aid to small farmers largely because of the political standoff at the international level.
Elich: That brings me to my next question. What advice are you and the AIAS providing to the government of Zimbabwe in regard to agriculture? Obviously, a timely and sufficient provision of seed and fertilizer is essential, but there are hindrances. There is also a shortage of fuel, farming implements, irrigation schemes, and financial assistance. Under the circumstances, I assume that any recovery plan is going to have relatively modest short-term goals and a more ambitious long-range plan. And finally, what results would you anticipate from a successful establishment of a government of national unity?
Moyo: We have argued for a greater effort to support small farm producers with subsidized seeds and inputs for food production, and measures to improve their marketing of products as a primary step. This includes some levels of decontrolling the pricing of staple foods, so that producers get a better price, and to cut out usurious middle persons. Extension services and information on inputs and related services need to be enhanced through creative measures. A revised strategy for smallholder farming development, combined with a transformative social protection policy agenda (subsidies for rural health, education, etc.), is required to rebuild the rural economy and national food security.
An agro-industrial sector recovery program is also necessary, contrary to those who seek to use the situation to finish off existing under-utilized capacities through their calls for full-scale de-protection and liberalization as a condition for refinancing the country. Since local fertilizer production is also hampered by shortages of forex to import raw materials and by electricity shortages, this has had to be imported while capacities still exist but are forex-starved due to shortages. This applies to the variety of agro-industries (veterinary materials, agricultural chemicals, and machinery and equipment, etc.). The available forex resources have been spread widely across the economy, rather than prioritized on agro-industry and smallholder food production. The last droughts reduced small producer incomes, let alone savings, such that effective "demand" for inputs is low and this limits the recovery of agro-industrial production, too.
Moreover, we have always called for humanitarian aid to assist the recovery of small producers, but this has not materialized. It has certainly not been prioritized by donors, although to some extent the government has not been helpful by limiting the operations of some NGOs. What is required is less belligerence on both sides and agreement on a constructive and less politicized approach to aid by both sides. After all most African countries, including those performing well in food production (e.g. Malawi, etc.), receive such aid.
Yes, besides these shorter-term measures, a comprehensive development plan needs to be put in place on the basis of wider national consensus, which the inclusive government could promote. This will hinge on how to refinance the economy in the medium to long term, including from new sources of state revenue (e.g. from dividends that could be gotten from existing and new mining investments, increased collection of taxes from the now informalized formal sectors whose production is below capacity), from new investments (especially in mining if suitable terms are negotiated), and from concessional loans and credit. In general the balance of payments deficit means that government has been operating on a restricted cash budget and making ad hoc allocations of forex as pressing needs surface. Broader international support (e.g. besides the west, including from SADC, China, Venezuela, etc.) could be sought to widen the terms of borrowing and therefore integration into a wider world economy. The planning should become more coherent and transparent, and thus reduce corruption in the public and private sphere. For in the inflationary context finance capital has been happier to trade speculatively on money and other imported goods which give them quicker and higher returns, while charging markups of above 100%.
The inclusive government might enable the government to procure long-term concessional loans and credit on better conditions. However the signs from the International Financial Institutions and donors is that they would wait for certain political guarantees and would want full-scale liberalization to release money. The inclusive government might also get more humanitarian aid to pay for health, sanitation, HIV-AIDS, and education, thus releasing some resources to pay for agricultural inputs and the maintenance of related infrastructures.
The recovery in the medium term will depend on political "normalization" relating to a new economic situation, which accepts the current land redistribution while reducing some of the remaining and new land holding inequalities, including accommodating some of the former land owners on smaller farms -- like their new counterparts, on the principle of equitable land rights and not privilege. The thrust would be to attempt to build on the new configuration of property relations in agriculture, mining, and industry (including the new small and medium scale enterprises in all these sectors, and the emerging state mining ventures). This requires the removal of sanctions (which many continue to deny exist, let alone recognize their social effects) and the depolarization/de-demonization of the Zimbabwe "crisis" at the international level. To the extent that pressure is reduced on forex to import key goods, the speculative economy could be dampened, thus limiting some of the inflationary behavior. Removing sanctions is also critical to encouraging the investors to revive industries and mines, and to allow "investors" to continue with their plans.
There is no doubt that the issue of compensating former landowners for some degree of their losses for their improvements on the land, in realistic terms, will have to be negotiated in order to put to rest the land transfer process. The UK would have to be drawn in on this, and other donors might participate. This is a position that SADC has proposed, and is etched into the recent agreement on the inclusive government signed by the political parties. We have advised that government takes this issue up and enhances public knowledge on the issues involved, so as to garner broadly based support for any decisions taken.
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Sam Moyo is a land policy analyst and Executive Director of the African Institute for Agrarian Studies. He is also chairperson of the ZERO Regional Environment Organization, based in Harare, and a former director of the Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies of the Sapes Trust. Among his published works are two recent books that he co-edited: Reclaiming the Land: The Resurgence of Rural Movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and Land and Sustainable Development in Africa. Gregory Elich is the author of Strange Liberators: Militarism, Mayhem and the Pursuit of Profit.
Labels: GREG ELICH, LAND REFORM, SAM MOYO
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One Unified African People: An interview with Obi Egbuna
Gregory Elich: One Unified African People-An interview with Obi Egbuna
Sun, 07 Jun 2009 03:17:00 +0000
BELOW, we reproduce a 2006 interview between writer Gregory Elich and Obi Egbuna - a founding member of the Pan-African Liberation Organization. Egbuna has devoted his life to the struggle to unify the African continent and the African Diaspora. His activities have led him to split his time between the U.S. and Zimbabwe. According to Elich, in this interview, he was interested in finding out more about the Pan-African Liberation Organization and its role in the pan-African movement.
Full interview transcript
Q: You are a founding member of the Pan-African Liberation Organization (PALO). Tell us something about PALO: its history, its philosophy, and its goals for the future.
Egbuna: The organization was founded on April 1, 1991, 31 years after the founding of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, which is why we strategically picked that particular date. The original name was the Pan African Student Youth United Front. The year before, we had created a student umbrella organization called the United Pan African Front with students from the University of Maryland/College Park, George Washington University, Howard University, Catholic University, American University, and the University of the District of Columbia.
We felt at that point that the student/youth movement in the African community needed to put immense pressure on our traditional organizations like the National Council of Negro Women, Nation of Islam, NAACP, All African People's Revolutionary Party, etc. to form an African United Front.
We felt it was mainly because of the tendency to embrace capitalist models of leadership that was the root cause for the delay in the establishment of a functional and productive United Front representing the broadest spectrum of our organized formations. Our main philosophical influences are Osagyefo Kwame Nkrumah and Ahmed Seku Ture.
Our main objective is One Unified African People at home and abroad and One Unified Socialist African Continent. Our goals for the future are to identify the issues with the most potential to unite us worldwide, and right now our work around the issues of Zimbabwe and Cuba in particular represent our practical expression of what we believe in theory.
Q: We live in a unipolar world in which the West did much to promote the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia into a number of smaller, weaker, and therefore more easily controlled nations. A united socialist Africa would have immense significance not only for the people of Africa but the world as well. But rallying support for the cause in the face of Western hostility presents special problems. You allude in your last answer to the first practical steps toward achieving that goal. Please tell us more about your work in support of pan-African liberation. I understand, for instance, that some time ago you moved to Zimbabwe in order to more effectively put your ideals into action.
Egbuna: This is an important question to address. This year marks the 40th anniversary of the overthrow of Osagyefo Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention Peoples Party in Ghana (February 24th 1966), the 30th anniversary of the Soweto uprising (June 16th 1976), and the 40th anniversary of SNCC's resurrection of Frederick Douglass' slogan "Black Power."
As African people we approach Zimbabwe in the context of honoring our historical responsibility to defend liberated and sovereign territory on our beloved mother continent. For progressive and revolutionary forces in African communities worldwide, Zimbabwe means what Cuba and Venezuela mean to Latin American anti-imperialist resistance, or what Palestine means to Arab and Muslim forces opposed to imperialist domination.
We've worked with our comrades in Zimbabwe for four years at a very intense level through the diplomatic corps in the U.S. (the embassy in Washington and the UN Mission in New York City). In 2003 we had the honor and privilege of chatting with President Mugabe at the UN while he was participating in the UN general assembly.
He thanked us for the work we had done up to that point and urged us to intensify everything we were doing. The previous Zimbabwean ambassador to the U.S., Dr. Simbi Mubako, recommended that we go to Zimbabwe and spend extended time on the ground.
At that point, however we felt we hadn't done enough on behalf of the government, party and people. In PALO we believe in working first and traveling later. This way our beloved comrades will be familiar with the track record of labor done on their behalf. We also decided that as Africans the concept of splash delegations has gotten us nowhere.
What I mean by splash delegations is when national spokespeople in our community travel abroad mainly to countries on U.S. imperialism's radar screen (in Africa, Asia, and Latin America). Then after receiving red carpet treatment and promising the heads of state everything under the sun, they return to the U.S. only to hold a press conference highlighting their visit and two or three months later we forget why they went in the first place.
This approach undermines crucial relationships that Africans in the U.S. must build and maintain with our comrades in every corner of the world.
We felt that we needed to work in Zimbabwe like Kwame Ture and Shirley Graham DuBois did in Guinea, Frantz Fanon did in Algeria, Julian Mayfield and W.E.B. DuBois did in Ghana, and lastly how Che Guevara did in Cuba and how Eugene Godfried and Assata Shakur are presently doing in Cuba. I was in Zimbabwe from April to September working with Zanu PF on the party side and also on the Government side, mainly through the Ministry of Information and Publicity.
But I'm also working with the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, Ministry of Education Sports and Culture, and the National HIV Aids Council. I went to Zimbabwe also for the purpose of bridging the gap between the Cuban solidarity work being done by Africans in the U.S. and those in Southern Africa, which is the hub of Cuban solidarity on the Continent.
I'm a member of the Zimbabwe-Cuba Friendship Association and working to rebuild the Zimbabwe Palestinian Friendship organization. I'll be returning to Zimbabwe in November and remaining there until February to continue the work on the ground that will result in an increase of genuine uncompromising support for President Mugabe and Zanu PF.
Q: I've heard from a number of people who have informed me that Zimbabwe's land reform has won wide popular support throughout Africa. Do you think that land reform has the potential to act as a catalyst for positive change throughout the continent of Africa? Could this also be a rallying point for building a movement for the political and economic unification of Africa?
Egbuna: With the death of Yasser Arafat, President Mugabe has emerged as the international spokesperson for land reclamation worldwide. It begins with Africa. If you remember, the youth league of the ANC was the first entity on the other side of the Limpopo River to endorse the land reclamation program in Zimbabwe.
This was crucial because even after international support for the Palestinian question and reparations for slavery at the United Nations Conference Against Racism, Xenophobia and Other Related Intolerances, held in Durban, South Africa, this still didn't translate into an intensification of the struggle for land reclamation in South Africa, where 83% of the land remains in the hands of whites.
The President of Cote D'Ivoire sent an envoy to Zimbabwe three years back, seeking consultation and advice from President Mugabe about how they could reclaim their land. We also see how the courageous vision of Zimbabwe helped spark this issue next door in Namibia, where 44% of the land was still in the hands of whites there. We can also look at the Harare agricultural festival, which was opened by Botswana's President Festus Mogae, who reaffirmed his support for the land program in Zimbabwe and denounced the illegal sanctions.
Zambia's President, who was also in attendance, stressed the same points. President Mugabe received recognition in April from Malawi's President Mutharika, who named a road in his honor despite a threat by the European Union to pull out of a project to rebuild roads in the country unless Mugabe wasn't uninvited. This, however, didn't budge President Mutharika one bit. We then have to look outside of Africa. President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela said at the UN Food and Poverty Organization meeting last year in Rome that Zimbabwe was the model for his agrarian reform program.
It was comical to see Chirac in France praise Comrade Evo Morales in Bolivia for the program he decided to embark on against the ruling elite in Bolivia, knowing that the reason the European Union is trying to force an illegal imperialist-driven regime change in Zimbabwe is because of the uncompromising stand of President Mugabe and Zanu PF on the issue of land.
I just had a great dialogue with WaBun-Inini (aka Vernon Bellecourt), a principal spokesperson for the American Indian Movement/International Indian Treaty Council. He's in the process of drafting a statement of support for President Mugabe and anu PF. I feel great about this because WaBun-Inini defends Libya with more courage and passion than most Africans in the U.S. He went to jail for defying Ronald Reagan's travel ban on Libya in 1987. Many forget or overlook that the U.S. is a settler colony. So their arrogance towards a people who have endured slavery and colonialism and who are reclaiming what is rightfully theirs is expected and resisted, like in the case of Zimbabwe.
I also have to mention that I was pleased that International A.N.S.W.E.R. arranged for me to read the Zimbabwe-Cuba Friendship Association's (ZIMCUFA) statement on the Cuban Five at the rally they sponsored in support of the five patriots, in front of the FBI building and the Department of Justice. I had been out of the states for six months and they needed a new updated photograph of me on U.S. soil anyway.
I'm sure the US embassy in Zimbabwe has plenty of me in Harare. I think this was a special act on A.N.S.W.E.R.'s part, because many entities external to the African community don't appear to respect the role Zimbabwe plays in the anti-imperialist movement. Many of them are quicker to talk about forces in Latin America and the Caribbean only because of their geographical proximity to Latin America and more recently the Middle East, which is really North Africa.
It appears that resistance in sub-Saharan Africa is the dark side of the moon for them, so maybe by showing Zimbabwe's relationship to Cuba through the issue of the five or by having them see that Southern Africa is the driving force for Cuban solidarity on the continent of Africa, they can come to recognize the importance of this issue. This is evident when we highlight the 36,000 troops from Cuba who, for 14 years, fought in Angola, winning a decisive victory at Cuito Cuanavale; or the fact that Mugabe and Mandela are recipients of the Jose Marti Order, Cuba's highest honor (Mugabe in 1985 and Mandela in 1991).
Since Hugo Chavez has emerged as the darling of these circles, they also have to see who his favorite African president is. Mugabe received a replica of Simon Bolivar's sword in 2003 and we are grateful to Comrade Chavez for that. This trip in Zimbabwe we will also highlight the history of the Zimbabwe Palestinian Friendship organization to show that link to those who are part of the anti-Zionist efforts within U.S. borders.
Q: How may interested individuals go about contacting and joining the Pan-African Liberation Organization? What type of work can sympathetic people residing in the U.S. do in support of PALO's goals?
Egbuna: People interested in joining our ranks can reach out to us by emailing panafricanlib@yahoo.com. We're in the process of developing a web page to be a catalyst in helping our recruitment efforts. Individuals from the African community can join us if they support our objectives and don't belong to an organization already.
Organizations that are interested in collaborating on some of the projects we're working on, in particular the work around Zimbabwe or the Cuban Health Care Pilot Project, are more than welcome to link up with us.
The more organized resistance we have in the never-ending struggle for our liberation, human dignity, and humanity as a whole, the better.
Labels: GREG ELICH, NEOCOLONIALISM, OBI EGBUNA, PANAFRICANISM
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