Friday, December 21, 2012

(WHATS LEFT) Do Publicly Owned, Planned Economies Work?

Do Publicly Owned, Planned Economies Work?
Posted in Communism, Public Ownership and Planning, Socialism, Soviet Union, USSR by what's left on December 21, 2012

Compared to capitalism, the USSR’s publicly owned, planned economy worked remarkably well.

By Stephen Gowans

The Soviet Union was a concrete example of what a publicly owned, planned economy could produce: full employment, guaranteed pensions, paid maternity leave, limits on working hours, free healthcare and education (including higher education), subsidized vacations, inexpensive housing, low-cost childcare, subsidized public transportation, and rough income equality.

Most of us want these benefits. However, are they achievable permanently? It is widely believed that while the Soviet Union may have produced these benefits, in the end, Soviet public ownership and planning proved to be unworkable. Otherwise, how to account for the country’s demise? Yet, when the Soviet economy was publicly owned and planned, from 1928 to 1989, it reliably expanded from year to year, except during the war years.

To be clear, while capitalist economies plunged into a major depression and reliably lapsed into recessions every few years, the Soviet economy just as unfailingly did not, expanding unremittingly and always providing jobs for all. Far from being unworkable, the Soviet Union’s publicly owned and planned economy succeeded remarkably well. What was unworkable was capitalism, with its occasional depressions, regular recessions, mass unemployment, and extremes of wealth and poverty, all the more evident today as capitalist economies contract or limp along, condemning numberless people to forced idleness. What eventually led to the Soviet Union’s demise was the accumulated toll on the Soviet economy of the West’s efforts to bring it down, the Reagan administration’s intensification of the Cold War, and the Soviet leadership’s inability to find a way out of the predicament these developments occasioned.

By the 1980s, the USSR was showing the strains of the Cold War. Its economy was growing, but at slower pace than it had in the past. Military competition with its ideological competitor, the United States, had slowed growth in multiple ways. First, R&D resources were being monopolized by the military, starving the civilian economy of the best scientists, engineers, and machine tools. Second, military spending had increased to meet the Reagan administration’s abandonment of detente in favour of a renewed arms race that was explicitly targeted at crippling the Soviet economy. To deter US aggression, the Soviets spent a punishingly large percentage of GDP on the military while the Americans, with a larger economy, spent more in absolute terms but at a lower and more manageable share of national income. Third, to protect itself from the dangers of relying on foreign imports of important raw materials that could be cut off to bring the country to its knees, the Soviet Union chose to extract raw materials from its own vast territory. While making the USSR self-sufficient, internal sourcing ensnared the country in a Ricardian trap. The costs of producing raw materials increased, as new and more difficult-to-reach sources needed to be tapped as the older, easy-to-reach ones were exhausted. Fourth, in order to better defend the country, the Soviets sought allies in Eastern Europe and the Third World. However, because the USSR was richer than the countries and movements it allied with, it became the anchor and banker to other socialist countries, liberation movements, and states seeking to free themselves from despoliation by Western powers. As the number of its allies increased, and Washington manoeuvred to arm, finance, and support anti-communist insurgencies in an attempt to put added strain on the Soviet treasury, the costs to Moscow of supporting its allies mounted. These factors—corollaries of the need to provide for the Soviet Union’s defence—combined to push costs to the point where they seriously impeded Soviet economic growth.

With growth slowing, and the costs of defending the country increasing, it appeared as if it was only a matter of time before the USSR would find itself between the Scylla of an untenable military position and the Charybdis of arms race-driven bankruptcy. Mikhail Gorbachev, the country’s last leader, faced a dilemma: he could either bankrupt the economy by trying to keep pace with the Americans on arms spending or withdraw from the race altogether. Gorbachev chose the latter. He moved to end the Cold War, withdrawing military support from allies, and pledging cooperation with the United States. On the economic front, he set out to transform the Soviet Union into a Western-style social democracy. However, rather than rescuing the country from a future of ever slowing economic growth, Gorbachev’s capitulations on foreign and economic policy led to disaster. With the restraining hand of the Soviet Union lifted, the United States embarked on a series of aggressions around the world, beginning with Iraq, proceeding to Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq again, and then Libya, with numerous smaller interventions in between. Gorbachev’s abandonment of economic planning and efforts to clear the way for the implementation of a market economy pushed the country into crisis. Within five years, Russia was an economic basket case. Unemployment, homelessness, economic insecurity and social parasitism (living off the labour of others) returned with a vengeance.

On Christmas Day, 1991, the day the USSR officially ended, Gorbachev said, “We live in a new world. The Cold War is finished. The arms race and the mad militarization of states, which deformed our economy, society and values, have been stopped. The threat of world war has been lifted” (Roberts, 1999). This made Gorbachev wildly popular in the West. Russians were less enthusiastic. Contained within Gorbachev’s words was the truth about why the world’s first conscious attempt to build an alternative to capitalism had been brought to a close. It was not because the Soviet economic system had proved unworkable. On the contrary, it had worked better than capitalism. The real reason for the USSR’s demise was that its leadership capitulated to an American foe, which, from the end of World War II, and with growing vigour during the Reagan years, sought to arms race to death the Soviet economy. This was an economy that worked for the bottom 99 percent, and therefore, if allowed to thrive, would have discredited the privately owned, market-regulated economies that the top one percent favoured and benefited from. It was this model of free enterprise and market regulation which made vast wealth, security and comfort the prerogatives of captains of industry and titans of finance, and unemployment, poverty, hunger, economic insecurity, and indignity—the necessary conditions of the top one percent’s riches—the lot of everyone else.

The 21 years since the defeat of the USSR have not been kind. Stalin, under whose tutelage the world’s first publicly owned, planned economy was built, once issued a prophetic warning: “What would happen if capitalism succeeded in smashing the Republic of Soviets? There would set in an era of the blackest reaction in all the capitalist and colonial countries. The working class and the oppressed peoples would be seized by the throat, the positions of international communism would be lost” (Stalin, 1954). And just as Stalin had accurately prophesied 10 years before Operation Barbarossa, the Nazi invasion of the USSR, that his country had only 10 years to prepare for an attack, so too did he accurately foresee the consequences of the Soviet Union’s falling to the forces of capitalism. An era of the blackest reaction has, indeed, set in. Washington now has more latitude to use its muscular military to pursue its reactionary agenda around the world. Public ownership and planning hang on in Cuba and North Korea, but the United States and its allies use sanctions, diplomatic isolation and military harassment to sabotage the economies of the hold-outs (as they did the Soviet economy), so that the consequences can be falsely hung on what are alleged to be the deficiencies of public ownership and planning. They are in reality the consequences of a methodical program of low-level warfare. Encouraged to believe that the Soviet economic system had failed, many people, including both communist supporters and detractors of the Soviet Union, concluded that a system of public ownership and planning is inherently flawed. Communists abandoned communist parties for social democratic ones, or abandoned radical politics altogether. Social democrats shifted right, eschewing reform, and embracing neo-liberalism. In addition, Western governments, no longer needing to blunt the appeal of public ownership and planning, abandoned the public policy goal of full employment and declared robust public services to be no longer affordable (Kotz, 2001). At the same time, privatization in the former Soviet Union and formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe expanded the global supply of wage-labour, with predictable consequences for wage levels worldwide. The Soviet Union’s defeat has ushered in a heyday for capital. For the rest of us, our throats, as Stalin warned, have been seized.

The world’s largest capitalist economies have been in crisis since 2008. Some are trapped in an austerity death-spiral, some in the grips of recession, most growing slowly at best. Austerity—in reality the gutting of public services—is the prescribed pseudo-remedy. There is no end in sight. In some parts of Europe, official unemployment reaches well into the double-digits, youth unemployment higher still. In Greece, a country of 11 million, there are only 3.7 million employed (Walker and Kakaounaki, 2012). Moreover, the crisis can in no way be traced to an outside power systematically working to bring about capitalism’s demise, as the United States and its allies systematically worked to bring about the end of public ownership and planning in the USSR. Yet, free to develop without the encumbrance of an organized effort to sabotage it, capitalism is not working. Few point this out. By contrast, the Soviet model of public ownership and planning—which, from its inception was the target of a concerted effort to undermine it—never once, except during the extraordinary years of World War II, stumbled into recession, nor failed to provide full employment. Yet it is understood, including by some former supporters of the Soviet Union, to have been unworkable. Contrary to a widely held misconception, the experience of the Soviet Union did not demonstrate that an inherent weakness existed within its publicly owned, planned economy that doomed it to failure. It demonstrated, instead, the very opposite—that public ownership and planning could do what capitalism could not do: produce unremitting economic growth, full employment, an extensive array of free and nearly free public services, and a fairly egalitarian distribution of income. Moreover, it could do so year after year and continued to do so until the Soviet leadership pulled the plug. It also demonstrated that the top one percent would defend private ownership by using military, economic, and ideological means to crush a system that worked against them but worked splendidly for the bottom 99 percent (an effort that carries on today against Cuba and North Korea.)

The defeat of the Soviet Union has, indeed, ushered in a period of dark reaction. The way out remains, as ever, public ownership and planning—which the Soviet experience from 1928 to 1989 demonstrates works remarkably well—and struggle against those who would discredit, degrade or destroy it.

What Soviet public ownership and planning did for ordinary citizens of the USSR

The benefits of the Soviet economic system were found in the elimination of the ills of capitalism—an end to unemployment, inflation, depressions and recessions, and extremes of wealth and poverty; an end to exploitation, which is to say, the practice of living off the labour of others; and the provision of a wide array of free and virtually free public services.

Among the most important accomplishments of the Soviet economy was the abolition of unemployment. Not only did the Soviet Union provide jobs for all, work was considered a social obligation, of such importance that it was enshrined in the constitution. The 1936 constitution stipulated that “citizens of the USSR have the right to work, that is, are guaranteed the right to employment and payment for their work in accordance with quantity and quality.” On the other hand, making a living through means other than work was prohibited. Hence, deriving an income from rent, profits, speculation or the black market – social parasitism – was illegal (Szymanski, 1984). Finding a job was easy, because labour was typically in short supply. Consequently, employees had a high degree of bargaining power on the job, with obvious benefits in job security, and management paying close attention to employee satisfaction (Kotz, 2003).

Article 41 of the 1977 constitution capped the workweek at 41 hours. Workers on night shift worked seven hours but received full (eight-hour) shift pay. Workers employed at dangerous jobs (e.g., mining) or where sustained alertness was critical (e.g. physicians) worked six or seven-hour shifts, but received fulltime pay. Overtime work was prohibited except under special circumstances (Szymanski, 1984).

From the 1960s, employees received an average of one month of vacation (Keeran and Kenny, 2004; Szymanski, 1984) which could be taken at subsidized resorts (Kotz, 2003).

All Soviet citizens were provided a retirement income, men at the age of 60, and women at the age of 55 (Lerouge, 2010). The right to a pension (as well as disability benefits) was guaranteed by the Soviet constitution (Article 43, 1977), rather than being revocable and subject to the momentary whims of politicians, as is the case in capitalist countries.

Women were granted maternity leave from their jobs with full pay as early as 1936 and this, too, along with many other benefits, was guaranteed in the Soviet constitution (Article 122, 1936). At the same time, the 1936 constitution made provision for a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens, while the revised 1977 constitution obligated the state to help “the family by providing and developing a broad system of childcare…by paying grants on the birth of a child, by providing children’s allowances and benefits for large families” (Article 53). The Soviet Union was the first country to develop public childcare (Szymanski, 1984).

Women in the USSR were accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life (Article 122, 1936), including the equal right with men to employment, rest and leisure, social insurance and education. Among its many firsts, the USSR was the first country to legalize abortions, which were available at no cost (Sherman, 1969). It was also the first country to bring women into top government positions. An intense campaign was undertaken in Soviet Central Asia to liberate women from the misogynist oppression of conservative Islam. This produced a radical transformation of the condition of women’s lives in these areas (Szymanski, 1984).

The right to housing was guaranteed under a 1977 constitutional provision (Article 44). Urban housing space, however, was cramped, about half of what it was per capita in Austria and West Germany. The reasons were inadequate building in Tsarist times, the massive destruction of housing during World War II, and Soviet emphasis on heavy industry. Prior to the October Revolution, inadequate urban housing was built for ordinary people. After the revolution, new housing was built, but the housing stock remained insufficient. Housing draws heavily on capital, which the government needed urgently for the construction of industry. In addition, Nazi invaders destroyed one-third to one-half of Soviet dwellings during the Second World War (Sherman, 1969).

City-dwellers typically lived in apartment buildings owned by the enterprise in which they worked or by the local government. Rents were dirt cheap by law, about two to three percent of the family budget, while utilities were four to five percent (Szymanski, 1984; Keeran and Kenny, 2004). This differed sharply with the United States, where rents consumed a significant share of the average family budget (Szymanski, 1984), and still do.

Food staples and other necessities were subsidized, while luxury items were sold well above their costs.

Public transportation was efficient, extensive, and practically free. Subway fare was about eight cents in the 1970s, unchanged from the 1930s (Szymanski, 1984). Nothing comparable has ever existed in capitalist countries. This is because efficient, affordable and extensive public transportation would severely limit the profit-making opportunities of automobile manufacturers, petroleum companies, and civil engineering firms. In order to safeguard their profits, these firms use their wealth, connections and influence to stymie development of extensive, efficient and inexpensive public alternatives to private transportation. Governments, which need to keep private industry happy so that it continues to provide jobs, are constrained to play along. The only way to alter this is to bring capital under public control, in order to use it to meet public policy goals set out in a consciously constructed plan.

The Soviet Union placed greater stress on healthcare than their capitalist competitors did. No other country had more physicians per capita or more hospital beds per capita than the USSR. In 1977, the Soviet Union had 35 doctors and 212 hospital beds per 10,000 compared to 18 doctors and 63 hospital beds in the United States (Szymanski, 1984). Most important, healthcare was free. That US citizens had to pay for their healthcare was considered extremely barbaric in the Soviet Union, and Soviet citizens “often questioned US tourists quite incredulously on this point” (Sherman, 1969).

Education through university was also free, and stipends were available for post-secondary students, adequate to pay for textbooks, room and board, and other expenses (Sherman, 1969; Szymanski, 1984).

Income inequality in the Soviet Union was mild compared to capitalist countries. The difference between the highest income and the average wage was equivalent to the difference between the income of a physician in the United States and an average worker, about 8 to 10 times higher (Szymanski, 1984). The elite’s higher incomes afforded privileges no greater than being able to acquire a modest house and car (Kotz, 2000). By comparison, in 2010, Canada’s top-paid 100 CEOs received incomes 155 times higher than the average full-time wage. The average full-time wage was $43,000 (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2011). An income 10 times larger would be $430,000—about what members of the capitalist elite make in a single week. A factor that mitigated the modest degree of Soviet income inequality was the access all Soviet citizens had to essential services at no, or virtually, no cost. Accordingly, the degree of material inequality was even smaller than the degree of income inequality (Szymanski, 1984).

Soviet leaders did not live in the opulent mansions that are the commonplace residences of presidents, prime ministers and monarchs in most of the world’s capitals (Parenti, 1997). Gorbachev, for example, lived in a four-family apartment building. Leningrad’s top construction official lived in a one-bedroom apartment, while the top political official in Minsk, his wife, daughter and son-in-law inhabited a two-bedroom apartment (Kotz and Weir, 1997). Critics of the Soviet Union accused the elite of being an exploiting ruling class, but the elite’s modest incomes and humble material circumstances raise serious doubt about this assessment. If it was indeed an exploiting ruling class, it was the oddest one in human history.

The Soviet economy’s record of growth under public ownership and planning

From the moment in 1928 that the Soviet economy became publicly owned and planned, to the point in 1989 that the economy was pushed in a free market direction, Soviet GDP per capita growth exceeded that of all other countries but Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. GDP per person grew by a factor of 5.2, compared to 4.0 for Western Europe and 3.3 for the Western European offshoots (the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) (Allen, 2003). In other words, over the period in which its publicly owned, planned economy was in place, the USSR‘s record in raising incomes was better than that of the major industrialized capitalist countries. The Soviet Union’s robust growth over this period is all the more impressive considering that the period includes the war years when a major assault by Nazi Germany left a trail of utter destruction in its wake. The German invaders destroyed over 1,500 cities and towns, along with 70,000 villages, 31,000 factories, and nearly 100 million head of livestock (Leffler, 1994). Growth was highest to 1970, at which point expansion of the Soviet economy began to slow. However, even during this so-called (and misnamed) post-1970 period of stagnation, GDP per capita grew 27 percent (Allen, 2003).

While Soviet GDP per capita growth rates compare favorably with those of the major capitalist economies, a more relevant comparison is with the rest of the world. In 1928, the Soviet Union was still largely an agrarian country, and most people worked in agriculture, compared to a minority in Western Europe and North America. Hence, the economy of the USSR at the point of its transition to public ownership and planning was very different from that of the industrialized Western capitalist countries. On the other hand, the rest of the world resembled the Soviet Union in also being largely agrarian (Allen, 2003). It is therefore the rest of the world, not the United States and other advanced industrialized countries, with which the USSR should be compared. From 1928 to 1989, Soviet GDP per capita not only exceeded growth in the rich countries but exceeded growth in all other regions of the world combined, and to a greater degree. Hence, not only did the publicly owned, planned economy of the Soviet Union outpace the economies of richer capitalist economies, it grew even faster than the economies of countries that were most like the USSR in 1928. For example, outside its southern core, Latin America’s GDP per capita was $1,332 (1990 US dollars), almost equal to the USSR’s $1,370. By 1989, the Latin American figure had reached $4,886, but average income in the Soviet Union had climbed far higher, to $7,078 (Allen, 2003). Public ownership and planning had raised living standards to a higher level than capitalism had in Latin America, despite an equal starting point. Moreover, while the Soviet peacetime economy unfailingly expanded, the Latin American economy grew in fits and starts, with enterprises regularly shuttering their doors and laying off employees.

Perhaps the best illustration of how public ownership and planning performed better at raising living standards comes from a comparison of incomes in Soviet Central Asia with those of neighboring countries in the Middle East and South Asia. In 1928, these areas were in a pristinely pre-industrial state. Under public ownership and planning, incomes grew in Soviet Central Asia to $5,257 per annum by 1989, 32 percent higher than in neighboring capitalist Turkey, 44 percent higher than in neighboring capitalist Iran, and 241 percent higher than in neighboring capitalist Pakistan (Allen, 2003). For Central Asians, it was clear on which side of the Soviet Union’s border standards of living were highest.

US emulation of Soviet public funding of R&D

Advocates of a free enterprise economy would have you believe that public ownership and planning stifle innovation, while free enterprise encourages it. If that is the case, how do we explain:

• That the Soviet Union beat the United States into space in the 1950s, piling up a record of firsts in space exploration, and consequently setting off a panic in Washington?
• Most of the innovations in the United States, from the internet to Google’s search engine algorithm to advanced drugs and the i-Phone, are based, not on private investment, but government funding?

In fact, the truth about innovation is the exact opposite of what free-enterprise promoters would have us believe. It is not free enterprise, but planning and public funds, that drive it.

Soviet accomplishments in space, considered in light of the mistaken view that the USSR was always a poor second-best to the supposedly more dynamic United States, is truly startling. Soviet achievements include the first satellite, first animal in orbit, first human in orbit, first woman in orbit, first spacewalk, first moon impact, first image of the far side of the moon, first unmanned lunar soft landing, first space rover, first space station and first interplanetary probe. The panic created in Washington after the allegedly innovation-stifling Soviet economy allowed the USSR to beat its much richer ideological rival into space galvanized the United States to take a leaf from the Soviet book. Just as the Soviets were doing, Washington would use public funds to power research into innovations. This would be done through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. The DARPA would channel public money to scientists and engineers for military, space and other research. Many of the innovations to come out of the DARPA pipeline would eventually make their way to private investors, who would use them for private profit (Mazzucato, 2011). In this way, private investors were spared the trouble of risking their own capital, as free enterprise mythology would have us believe they do. In this myth, far-seeing and bold capitalists reap handsome profits as a reward for risking their capital on research that might never pay-off. Except this is not how it works. It is far better for investors to invest their capital in ventures with less risk and quicker returns, while allowing the public to shoulder the burden of funding R&D with its many risks and uncertainties. Using their wealth, influence and connections, investors have successfully pressed politicians into putting this pleasing arrangement in place. Free enterprise reality, then, is based on the sucker system: Risk is “socialized” (i.e., borne by the public, the suckers) while benefits are “privatized” (by investors who have manipulated politicians into shifting to the public the burden of funding R&D.)

A study by Block and Keller (2008) found that between 1971 and 2006, 77 out of R&D Magazine’s top 88 innovations had been fully funded by the US government. Summarizing research by economist Mariana Mazzucato, Guardian columnist Seumas Milne (2012) points out that the

[a]lgorithms that underpinned Google’s success were funded by the public sector. The technology in the Apple iPhone was invented in the public sector. In both the US and Britain it was the state, not big pharma, that funded most groundbreaking ‘new molecular entity’ drugs, with the private sector then developing slight variations. And in Finland, it was the public sector that funded the early development of Nokia – and made a return on its investment.

Nuclear power, satellite and rocket technology, and the internet are other examples of innovations that were produced with public money, and have since been used for private profit. US president Barack Obama acknowledged the nature of the swindle in his 2011 State of the Nation Address. “Our free-enterprise system,” began the president, “is what drives innovation.” However, he immediately contradicted himself by saying, “But because it’s not always profitable for companies to invest in basic research, throughout history our government has provided cutting-edge scientists and inventors with the support that they need.”

All of this points to two important facts. (1) The United States kick-started innovation in its economy by emulating the Soviet model of state-directed research because free enterprise was not up to the task. (2) Rather than emulate the Soviet model for public benefit, the United States channels public money into R&D for private profit. From the second point can be inferred a third: The fact that the Soviets socialized the benefits that flow from socialized risk, while the United States privatizes them, reflects the antagonistic nature of the two societies: One, a mass-oriented society organized to benefit the masses; the other, a business society organized to benefit a minority of business owners. Capitalism, as the US president acknowledges, does not promote innovation, because “it is not always profitable for companies to invest in basic research.” On the other hand, state-directed funding is the source of innovation. Clearly, then, a political agenda has nurtured two myths: (a) That a system of public ownership and planning stifles innovation; (b) That the profit system stimulates it.

Why growth slowed

While the Soviet economy grew rapidly from 1928 to 1989 it never surpassed the economies of North America, Western Europe and Japan. Consequently, the USSR’s per capita income was always less than that of the industrialized capitalist economies. The comparative disadvantage in incomes and living standards was falsely attributed to the alleged inefficiencies of public ownership and planning, rather than to the reality that, having started further back than the rich capitalist countries, the Soviet Union had more ground to cover. When the race began in 1928, the Soviet Union was still a largely agrarian country while the United States was industrialized. Hence, the Soviet Union had to cover ground the United States had already covered when Russia was under the stifling rule of Tsarist tyranny. Moreover, it had to do so without riches extracted from other countries, as the United States, Britain, France and Japan had based part of their prosperity on exploiting their own formal and informal empires (Murphy, 2000). True, the USSR did have an empire of sorts—countries in Eastern Europe over which it exercised hegemony, but, except in the early post-WWII years, these countries were never exploited economically by the Soviet Union. If anything, the Soviets, who exported raw materials to Eastern Europe in return for manufactured goods, came out on the losing end of its trade relationship with its satellites. So long as they remained part of the Warsaw Pact—a defensive alliance formed after and in response to the creation of NATO—and maintained some semblance of public ownership and planning, Moscow allowed its Eastern European allies to chart their own course. Soviet hegemony, then, was limited to enforcing these two conditions (Szymanski, 1979).

By the mid-1970s there was serious concern in Washington that the Soviet economy was on a course to overtake that of the United States. Since Washington always pointed to the United States’ greater average income and higher living standards to mobilize the allegiance of its population to the free enterprise system, a Soviet lead would deal a mortal blow to the legitimacy of US capitalism. Careful estimates prepared in the United States showed that Soviet gross national product was gaining on that of the United States. In 1950, the Soviet economy was only one-third the size of the US economy but had grown to almost one-half only eight years later (Sherman, 1969). From the perspective of planners in Washington in the late 1950s, the danger loomed that at current rates of growth, the Soviet economy would overtake the US economy by 1982. At that point, the entire foundation of the US population’s belief in the legitimacy of free enterprise—that it produced higher living standards than public ownership and planning—would crumble. Something had to be done.

By 1975, the CIA estimated that the Soviet economy was 60 percent as large as the US economy (Kotz and Weir, 1997). However, Soviet economic growth was starting to slow. According to figures provided by Allen (2003), Soviet GDP per capita grew at an annual rate of 3.4 percent from 1928 to 1970, but at less than half that rate, 1.3 percent, from 1970 to 1989. Had the United States, alarmed at being beaten into space, and agitated by what seemed to be the very real prospect of being overtaken economically by the USSR, set out to sabotage Soviet economic progress?

The Cold War was never going to be kind to Soviet growth prospects. Soviet leaders recognized that a planned, publicly owned economy was an anathema to the captains of industry and titans of finance who use their wealth and connections to dominate policy in capitalist countries. The USSR had been invaded multiple times, and on two occasions by aggressive capitalist powers with the objective of wiping the Soviet system off the map. In order to deter future aggressions, it was necessary to keep pace militarily. Therefore, the Soviet Union struggled as best as it could to achieve a rough military parity to maintain a peaceful coexistence with its capitalist neighbours (Szymanski, 1979).

However, the smaller size of the Soviet economy relative to that of its ideological competitors created problems. The necessity of maintaining a rough military parity would mean spending a far higher percentage of GDP on the military compared to what the United States and other NATO countries spent on their armed forces. Resources that could otherwise have been deployed to industrial expansion to help the country catch up economically had instead to be channelled into self-defence (Murphy, 2000). From the 1950s through the 1970s, the Soviets spent 12 to 14 percent of their GDP on the military (Szymanski, 1984; Allen, 2003), a figure that would grow even higher later, when the Reagan administration hiked US military spending, anticipating a Soviet effort to keep up that would harm the USSR’s economy.

Another constraint imposed on the Soviet economy by the need to deter military aggression was the monopolization of R&D resources by the military. Keeping pace militarily involved an unceasing battle to catch up to US military innovations. When the United States exploded the first atom bomb in 1945, the Soviet Union raced to match the United States’ grim scientific feat, which it did four years later. The US introduction of the hydrogen bomb in 1952 was quickly followed by the Soviets exploding their own hydrogen bomb a year later. A US first in submarine-launched nuclear missiles was matched by the USSR a few years after. No major weapon was developed by the USSR first, with a single exception—the ICBM. Unlike the United States, the USSR had no military bases ringing its ideological rival, and therefore needed a way of delivering nuclear warheads over long distances. However, the aim was self-defence, and that the Soviet Union was usually in catch-up mode on weapons systems demonstrated that the United States was spurring the Cold War forward, not the USSR. For the Soviets, the Cold War was economic poison. For the Americans, the Cold War was a way to ruin the Soviet economy.

Because self-defence was a priority, the USSR’s best scientists and engineers were channelled into the military sector (Sherman, 1969). Soviet consumer goods were often said to have been of low quality, but no one ever said the same about Soviet military equipment. The reason why is clear: the military got first dibs on the best minds and best equipment and was never short of funding. There is a subsidiary point: high-quality Soviet arms were produced by a system of public ownership and planning, despite the myth that such a system is incapable of producing high-quality goods (Kotz, 2008). The necessity of channelling the bulk of, and best, R&D resources to the military meant that other sectors suffered, and GDP growth was impeded. For example, the Soviets floundered in their efforts to increase petroleum production because the metals, machinery, scientists and engineers needed to boost oil output were detailed to the military sector (Allen, 2003). Half of the machine tools produced and at least half of the R&D expenditures were going to the defence industry (Schweizer, 1994).

Another reason for the post-1975 slowdown in the Soviet economy was that the USSR had become ensnared in a Ricardian trap (Allen, 2003). The Soviet Union had an abundant supply of all the raw materials an industrial economy needed, and at first, they were easy to reach and therefore could be obtained at low cost. For example, in the early years of the USSR’s industrialization, open pit mines were dug near industrial centres. Minerals were close to the surface and could be transported over short distances to nearby factories. Therefore, production and transportation costs were minimal. However, over time, the minerals that were close to the surface were scooped out and pits became deeper and narrower. At deeper depths, the quantity of minerals that could be extracted diminished and the costs of reaching them increased. Eventually, the mines were exhausted, and new mines had to be opened, but at greater distances from industrial centres, which meant higher costs to transport raw materials to factories. The Soviet petroleum industry was equally caught in a Ricardian trap. In the early 1970s, the USSR was spending $4.6 billion per year to maintain its oil industry. As oil became more difficult to reach, the Soviets had to drill deeper and through harder rocks. Costs increased, reaching $6.0 billion by the end of the decade. By the early 1980s, costs had climbed to $9.0 billion a year (Schweizer, 1994). The Soviets could have escaped the Ricardian trap by shopping around for less expensive imports. However, that would have left them vulnerable to supply disruptions. The United States and its allies—who would always be hostile to the USSR, except when expediency dictated temporary alliances or easing of tension—could interdict raw materials heading to the USSR to bring the Soviet economy to its knees or extort concessions. In other words, given the very high likelihood that the United States would exploit opportunities to place the Soviet Union at a disadvantage, shopping around for cheap imports, rather than implementing a policy of resource self-sufficiency, was not a realistic option.

Another reason the Soviet economy slowed was that the costs to the USSR to support its allies began to mount to unsustainable levels. One way to bolster self-defence is to find friends who share the same enemy, and the Soviet Union set out to expand its alliance of friends by providing economic and military assistance to countries and movements hostile to the forces of reaction. In doing so, it became the banker for national liberation movements, Eastern European socialist countries, and various Third World countries seeking to escape and remain free from domination by powerful capitalist states. By 1981, the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies had 96,000 economic advisers in 75 countries and 16,000 military advisers in 34 countries, together with a contingent of 39,000 Cuban troops in Africa, an army for which Moscow was ultimately footing the bill. At the same time, the Soviets were picking up the tab for 72,000 Third World students enrolled in Soviet and East European universities (Miliband, 1989). By 1980, Moscow was spending $44 billion a year on its allies (Keeran and Kenny, 2004). It gave $4.5 billion in aid to Warsaw from August 1980 to August 1981 alone to help contain the US-supported Solidarity movement (Schweizer, 1994). Meanwhile, the war in Afghanistan was draining the Soviet treasury to the tune of $3 to $4 billion per year. In other words, the costs of sustaining allies had grown enormous, raw material costs were mounting, the best scientists, engineers and machine tools were being monopolized by the military, and military expenditures were consuming a punishingly large percentage of national income.

A large part of the predicament the Soviets found themselves in was due to a decision the Reagan administration had taken to try to cripple the Soviet economy. In October 1983, US president Ronald Reagan unveiled what would become known as the Reagan Doctrine. “The goal of the free world must no longer be stated in the negative, that is, resistance to Soviet expansionism,” announced the US president. Instead, the “goal of the free world must instead be stated in the affirmative. We must go on the offensive with a forward strategy of freedom” (Roberts, 1999). This was a declaration of the end of détente. The gloves were off.

More formally, the Reagan Doctrine was spelled out in a series of national security decision directives, or NSDDs. NSDD-66 announced that it would be US policy to disrupt the Soviet economy, while NSDD-75 committed the United States to trying to drive up costs in the Soviet economy in order to plunge the USSR into a crisis. The Soviet economy was to be squeezed, and one of the ways was to induce Moscow to increase its defence budget (Schweizer, 1994). A hi-tech arms race would be the key. It would not only force Moscow to divert more resources to the military, but would channel even more of the USSR’s scientists, engineers, machine tools, and budget into military R&D, reducing productive investments and hobbling the civilian economy even more than the Cold War already had. The aim was to force the USSR “to expend precious lifeblood to run a race against a more athletic foe” (Schweizer, 1994), a foe which had a larger economy and more resources to last the race because it had started at a higher level of development and was plundering various countries around the world of their riches.

Over the first six years of his presidency, Reagan more than doubled US military expenditures, buying 3,000 warplanes, 3,700 strategic missiles, and close to 10,000 tanks (Schweizer, 1994). To keep up, Soviet military spending, previously at 12 to 14 percent of GDP, started to climb. Already twice as large as the United States’ as a percentage of national income (Silber, 1994) the defence budget grew larger still. Military expenditures increased by 45 percent in five years, considerably outpacing growth in the Soviet economy. By 1990, the Soviets were spending more than 20 percent of the country’s GDP on defence (Englund, 2011). At the same time, Moscow increased its military R&D spending nearly two-fold. In the spring of 1984, Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko announced that ‘the complex international situation has forced us to divert a great deal of resources to strengthening the security of our country” (Schweizer, 1994).

Meanwhile, the Reagan administration had taken a page out of Che Guevara’s book. The Argentine revolutionary had called for not one, not two, but three Vietnams, to drain the US treasury. Turning Che’s doctrine against communism, CIA Director Bill Casey called for not one, not two, but a half a dozen Afghanistans. To bog down the Soviets in “their own Vietnam,” the Afghan mujahedeen were showered with money and arms. In Poland, financial, intelligence, and logistical support was poured into the Solidarity movement, forcing Moscow to increase support to the Polish government (Schweizer, 1994).

The Soviet media complained that the United States wanted to impose “an even more ruinous arms race,” adding that Washington hoped the Soviet economy would be exhausted (Izvestiya, 1986). Soviet foreign secretary Andrei Gromyko complained that the United States’ military build-up was aimed at exhausting the USSR’s material resources and forcing Moscow to surrender. Gorbachev echoed Gromyko, telling Soviet citizens that,

The US wants to exhaust the Soviet Union economically through a race in the most up-to-date and expensive space weapons. It wants to create various kinds of difficulties for the Soviet leadership, to wreck its plans, including in the social sphere, in the sphere of improving the standard of living of our people, thus arousing dissatisfaction among the people with their leadership (Schweizer, 1994).

Capitulation

By the mid-1980s, it was clear in both Washington and Moscow that the Soviet Union was in trouble. It was not that the system of public ownership and planning was not working. On the contrary, recognizing the advantages of the Soviet system, the United States itself had emulated it to stimulate innovation in its own economy. Moreover, the Soviet economy was still reliably expanding, as it had done every year in peacetime since Stalin had brought it under public control in 1928. However, defending the country in the face of a stepped up Cold War was threatening to choke off economic growth altogether. It was clear that Moscow’s prospects for keeping pace with the United States militarily, while at the same time propping up allies under attack by US-fuelled anti-communist insurgencies and overthrow movements, were far from sanguine. The United States had manoeuvred the Soviet Union into a trap. If Moscow continued to try to match the United States militarily, it would eventually bankrupt itself, in which case its ability to deter US aggression would be lost. If it did not try to keep pace, it could no longer deter US aggression. No matter which way Moscow turned, the outcome would be the same. The only difference was how long it would take the inevitable to play out.

Gorbachev chose to meet the inevitable sooner rather than later. His foreign affairs adviser, Anatoly Chernayaev, recalls that it was “an imperative for Gorbachev that we had to put an end to the Cold War, that we had to reduce our military budget significantly, that we had to limit our military industrial complex in some way” (Schweizer, 1994). The necessity of reining in the defence budget was echoed by another Gorbachev adviser, Aleksandr Yokovlev, who would later recall that “It was clear that our military spending was enormous and we had to reduce it” (Blum, 1995). Gorbachev therefore withdrew support from allies and pledged cooperation with the United States. This was a surrender. The capitulation was hidden behind honeyed phrases about promoting international cooperation and fostering universal human values, but the rhetoric did not hide the fact that Gorbachev was throwing in the towel. He described the surrender as a victory for humanity, declaring that he had averted “the threat of nuclear war,” ended the “nuclear arms race,” reduced “conventional armed forces,” settled “numerous regional conflicts involving the Soviet Union and the United States,” and replaced “the division of the European continent into hostile camps with … a common European home” (Gorbachev, 2011). In reducing the threat of a global nuclear conflagration, Gorbachev had indeed achieved a victory for humanity. However, the victory was brought about by caving in to the United States, which was now free to run roughshod over countries that were too weak to refuse US demands that they yield to US political, military and economic domination.

On domestic matters, Gorbachev—who identified himself with the virtually social democratic position of the Italian Communist Party (Hobsbawm, 1994)—tried to turn the Soviet Union into a Western-style social democracy (Roberts, 1999). He cited the need to reverse the slowdown in the Soviet economy as his rationale for the transition (Gorbachev, 1988). Economic growth had certainly slowed, and there was indeed a danger that continued slow growth would threaten the country’s position vis-à-vis its capitalist rivals. However, Gorbachev’s solution amounted to, “If you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em.” The planning apparatus, which had unfailingly charted a course for unremitting growth during peacetime, was dismantled, in order to move the economy toward regulation by market forces. Rather than boosting economic growth, as Gorbachev hoped, the abandonment of planning did the very opposite. The economy tumbled headlong into an abyss, from which the USSR’s successor countries would not emerge for years. As one wag put it, “Stalin found the Soviet Union a wreck and left it a superpower; Gorbachev found it a superpower and left it a wreck.” Gorbachev is still widely admired in the West, but his popularity stops at the Russian border. A March 2011 poll found that only one in 20 Russians admire the Soviet Union’s last leader, and that “perestroika,” the name for Gorbachev’s move toward a market economy, “has almost purely negative connotations” (Applebaum, 2011).

The superior system

With few exceptions, what passes for serious discussion of the USSR is shot through with prejudice, distortion, and misconception. Locked in battle with the Soviet Union for decades, Washington deliberately fostered misunderstandings of its ideological foe. The aim was to make the USSR appear bleak, brutal, repressive, economically sluggish and inefficient—not the kind of place anyone of sound mind would want to emulate or live in. Today, scholars, journalists, politicians, state officials, and even some communists repeat old Cold War propaganda. The Soviet economy, in their view, never worked particularly well. However, the truth of the matter is that it worked very well. It grew faster over the period it was publicly owned and planned than did the supposedly dynamic US economy, to say nothing of the economies of countries that were as undeveloped as the USSR was in 1928, when the Soviet economy was brought under public control. The Soviet economy was innovative enough to allow the USSR to beat the United States into space, despite the United States’ greater resources, an event that inspired the Americans to mimic the Soviet Union’s public support for R&D. Moreover, the Soviet system of public ownership and planning efficiently employed all its capital and human resources, rather than maintaining armies of unemployed workers and inefficiently running below capacity, as capitalist economies regularly do. Every year, from 1928 to 1989, except during the war years, the Soviet economy reliably expanded, providing jobs, shelter, and a wide array of low- and no-cost public services to all, while capitalist economies regularly sank into recession and had to continually struggle out of them on the wreckage of human lives.

The US National Intelligence Council warns ominously that a crisis-prone world economy could produce chaos and distress on an even greater scale than the last crisis (Shanker, 2012). Offering a “grim prognosis” on the world economy, the UN warns of “a new global recession that mires many countries in a cycle of austerity and unemployment for years” (Gladstone, 2012). Yet at the same time, we are told that the Soviet economy never worked, and that capitalism, with its regular crises, and failure to provide employment, food, clothing and shelter to all, is both the only game in town and the superior system. Clearly, it is neither superior—on the contrary, it is clearly inferior—nor it is the only choice. Not only can we do better, we have done better. It is time to tear down the wall of politically engineered misconceptions about public ownership and planning. For too long, the wall has kept us from seeing a viable alternative model to capitalism whose track record of unequalled success points to a realistic and possible future for the bottom 99 percent—a future free from unemployment, recessions, extremes of wealth and poverty, and where essential goods and services are available at no cost to all.

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Applebaum, Binyamin (2012). “A shrinking military budget may take neighbours with it”, The New York Times, January 6, 2012.

Block, Fred and Keller, Matthew R (2008). “Where do innovations come from? Transformations in the U.S. national innovation system, 1970-2006,” Technology and Innovation Foundation, July 2008. http://www.itif.org/files/Where_do_innovations_come_from.pdf

Blum, William (1995). Killing Hope: U.S. Military Interventions since World War II, Common Courage Press, 1995.

Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (2011). “Hennessy’s Index”, February, 2011.

Englund, Will (2011). “Gorbachev in London: Credit, no cash”, The Washington Post, July 16, 2011.

Gladstone, Rick (2012). “U.N. presents grim prognosis on the world economy,” The New York Times, December 18, 2012.

Gorbachev, Mikhail (1988). Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World, Harper & Row.

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Hobsbawm, Eric (1994). Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991, Abacus, 1994.

Izvestiya (1986). “Chance missed, search continues”, October 17, 1986, cited in Schweizer, 1994.

Keeran, Roger and Kenny, Thomas (2004). Socialism Betrayed: Behind the Collapse of the Soviet Union, International Publishers, New York, 2004.

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Miliband, Ralph (1989). Divided Societies: Class Struggle in Contemporary Capitalism, Oxford University Press, 1989.

Milne, Seumas (2012). “Budget 2012: George Osborne is stuck in a failed economic model, circa 1979,” The Guardian (UK), March 20, 2012.

Murphy, Austin (2000). The Triumph of Evil: The Realities of the USA’s Cold War Victory, European Press Academic Publishing, 2000.

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Roberts, Geoffrey (1999). The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991, Routledge, 1999.

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Sherman, Howard J (1969). The Soviet Economy, Little, Brown and Company, 1969.

Silber, Irwin (1994). Socialism: What Went Wrong? An Inquiry into the Theoretical and Historical Sources of the Socialist Crisis, Pluto Press, 1994

Stalin, J.V., Works, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954, vol. 9, pp. 28-29. Report delivered at the 7th enlarged Plenum, December, 1926.

Szymanski, Albert (1979). Is the Red Flag Flying? The Political Economy of the Soviet Union Today, Zed Press, London, 1979.

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Thursday, November 29, 2012

(GLOBALRESEARCH) How Neoliberal Tax and Financial Policy Impoverishes Russia – Needlessly

How Neoliberal Tax and Financial Policy Impoverishes Russia – Needlessly
By Michael Hudson
Global Research, November 28, 2012
Michael-Hudson.com 23 November 2012

A shorter version of this paper has been published in the Russian Academy of Sciences journal, Mir Peremen (The World of Transformations), 2012 (3):49-64 (in Russian). An earlier version was posted by the Global Policy Forum meeting in Yaroslavl, Russia, September 7-8, 2011, on its website.

Russian poverty is unnecessary. Like all poverty in today’s high-productivity age, it is the result of bad policy. There is no technological need for it, nor is Russia lacking in a full spectrum of natural resources and economic potential. So future historians no doubt will puzzle over how the nation was convinced to de-industrialize its economy and impoverish much of its population in favor of exporting fuels and minerals, and to impose more regressive taxes on labor and industry than existed anywhere in the West – having been assured that this would streamline growth, not stifle it.

Neoliberal advisors promised that Russia would become more efficient and affluent by following an almost diametrically opposite path from that which Britain, the United States, Germany, Japan and modern China took to raise themselves to industrial power – the policies that classical 19th-century liberals endorsed to reduce the power of rentiers over the economy and government. Instead, post-Soviet polarization between rich and poor over the past twenty years has seen falling living standards and a dismantling of manufacturing, education and public infrastructure go hand in hand with creation of a new class of instant billionaires at the top of a steeper economic pyramid than exists in Western industrial powers.

This polarization was implicit in the policy advice outlined in 1990, a year before the Soviet Union dissolved, at meetings with the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and other inter-governmental organizations in Houston, Texas.
[1] It is part of the worldwide dynamic of financialization centralizing planning in the banking sector – a combination of debt leveraging, privatization and dismantling government’s traditional role.

The shock therapy and “grabitization” that concentrated wealth while dismantling public regulation and separating resource rents from the financing of social spending was not a natural or inevitable result of Soviet Communism. This sharply anti-labor policy and rejection of a mixed economy finds its origins in Chile after the 1973 military coup, and the Thatcher and Reagan decade of the 1980s that reversed the Progressive Era’s reforms that had broadened the economic base, nurturing a middle class and thriving domestic markets.

Making Russia dependent on Western credit by wiping out Russia’s domestic savings

Today’s economic polarization was planned at the outset, in the logic spelled out at the 1990 Houston Summit. Neoliberals were given a free hand in designing the post-Soviet economies, and they had no intention of creating a Western style mixed economy with progressive taxation and anti-monopoly regulation. The very idea was anathema to them. The ensuing dismantling of industry and asset stripping throughout the former Soviet Union stands as an indictment to the advice they gave.

When a government pursues impoverishing economic policies for a sustained length of time, there always are special interests at work. In Russia’s case the main beneficiaries were Western investors. Their self-serving program is clearest in what the Houston report excluded from consideration: the prospect of businessmen amassing fortunes through banking and insider dealing rather than by real capital formation, realizing their gains by selling their shares abroad – and keeping the proceeds in the West.

The World Bank, IMF and other institutions adhering to the “Washington Consensus” presented Russia with a plan that started by wiping out domestic savings (dismissed as “the overhang”), it was claimed that when markets were freed, spending the savings that Russians had made in hope of buying cars or other basic needs would be inflationary – so they had to be wiped out. The ostensible excuse was to promote price stability. But the “shock therapy” of hyperinflation and depreciation of the ruble (Houston Report, p. 13) wiped out the value of domestic savings after 1991. The sudden opening of currency markets led to be a flight out of rubles to exchange for the dollars (and some European purchases) coming in to buy enterprises from the managers who had gained ownership. And after hyperinflation, only Westerners had money to pay. Only politically well-placed insiders were in a position to save large amounts in dollars – by selling their shares to western investors.

The only way for most Russians to buy into the nation’s natural resources, housing or enterprises was by a voucher plan that was little more than a pretense at giving workers a share of the nation’s assets. In practice the vouchers were simply an opportunity for insiders, investment funds and bankers to obtain ownership. “There may well be advantages to giving away some shares in some of the larger enterprises,” the Report opined (pp. 26-27). But it advised Russia to block workers from having a voice in management. “Workers’ ownership in enterprises … would run counter to the desired objectives of enterprise reform” (p. 22). Workers not be given direct voting stock, but preferably shares in money-management companies, which would vote for the enterprise to make money along financialized lines rather than to promote the welfare of employees.

So, the voucher program was organized throughout the former Soviet economies in a way that workers received little benefit. Everyone was given vouchers ostensibly representing a democratic share of national assets, but for most holders these turned out to be worth only the price of a meal (or about $25) to. They quickly ended up in the hands of company managers and insiders, investment funds and bankers – whose interest was to cash out by selling their shares to Western buyers.

To facilitate privatization, the fortunate recipients were to be given sufficiently firm ownership rights to sell to foreigners without future legal obstruction. “While the portfolio of government properties that could eventually be privatized is, indeed, very large and much in excess of any measure of the overhang, privatization is likely to proceed slowly, particularly in advance of the clarification of ownership rights” (italics added). This was as highly enriching for the U.S. economy and the West as it was impoverishing for Russia – while its stock market became the deal of a century for global investors.

Meanwhile, the Houston Report’s neoliberal advice blocked Russia’s government from Keynesian-type spending programs to support the economy and invest in infrastructure. Russia was told to restrict its budget deficit to a drastic low of 2½ to 3 percent of GDP. This blocked it from providing the economy with the purchasing power needed to grow. And as an even more restrictive coup de grace, Russia was told to back its domestic money with foreign exchange.

No country needs foreign-currency reserves to pay public employees or cover other domestic payments. Central banks have monetized government spending from the Bank of England in 1694 through the U.S. Federal Reserve in 1913. It therefore was a radical constraint for Russia to back its domestic money 100% by foreign reserves – in the form of loans to the U.S. Government (that is, Treasury bills). Russia borrowed the money, mainly from Wall Street institutions that made 100% annually in interest by lending to the Russian government to back its issue of rubles. Meanwhile, many employees went six months or more without pay in the mid-1990s as a result of a needless reluctance to create domestic money. Many companies did not even pay wages during the mid-1990s as managers used their cash flow for financial speculation or simply bled companies to use the money themselves – and usually to send it to the West.

There almost always is a special interest that benefits when bad economic advice is followed. The beneficiary of today’s neoliberalism is the financial sector and its major customers: real estate and monopolies bought on credit. Russian poverty has created fortunes for bankers, political insiders, corporate raiders and hedge funds. For this new class of billionaires, the poverty and debt leveraging that has prompted many economists to wring their hands is actually a success story. Society’s loss has become their gain – and that of the financial markets.

The moral is that finance has replaced military force as today’s mode of warfare. It is in the financial sphere that the causes of Russian poverty are to be found, and consequent emigration, capital flight and de-industrialization. Inasmuch as U.S. strategists view industrial manufacturing power, and indeed higher education as being potentially military, Russian poverty has served the aims of U.S. global planners. Russia’s economy has focused on exporting fuels and raw materials to the West instead of becoming an industrial and agricultural rival.

Subjecting labor to austerity

In 1990 the impression was that Western advisors would help the Soviet economy become prosperous and competitive by setting it on the path that had enabled North America and Western Europe to get rich. But instead of helping Russia follow successful U.S. experience, they advocated just the opposite policy. In contrast to America’s “economy of high wages” doctrine recognizing that highly paid, well-educated and well fed and clothed labor – with subsidized public infrastructure – is sufficiently more productive to undersell lower-paid labor and privatized monopolies, neoliberal doctrine advocates squeezing down labor’s rate of remuneration and scaling back public social spending.

The resulting unequal concentration of wealth siphoned off income that would have been spent on domestic consumption if it were distributed more widely. The Houston Report’s anti-labor austerity economics thus stifled demand for domestic Russian output. And instead of making the economy more competitive, poverty-level wages caused a brain drain of skilled labor and failed to provide the education needed for high productivity in today’s world. The flat-tax and “financialized” management policies implemented by the Harvard Boys, Jeffrey Sachs and other neoliberals were the opposite of how the Western economies built up their own productive powers and living standards, and spurred the flight of skilled labor and capital.

Few economists have explained why this neoliberal advice was so bad. There has been little discussion of the alternatives available to the shock therapy and hyperinflation that wiped out savings, the voucher disaster, the 1994-95 loans-for-shares deal, and the central bank policy of borrowing abroad to finance the government’s budget deficit. It is as if the only alternative to Soviet bureaucracy was to follow the advice given by the IMF, World Bank and Harvard Boys to give away public enterprise, to be sold off in due course to foreign buyers.

Progressive Era policies from the United States to Germany and Japan aimed at bringing prices in line with current costs of production in a mixed economy. Governments provided basic infrastructure at cost or at subsidized rates. By not significantly taxing land and property, post-Soviet governments blocked themselves from playing the positive investment and fiscal role that they did in the West. Instead, they gave a free lunch to rentiers, above all to foreign investors.

How neoliberal anti-government ideology dismantled public infrastructure

If Russia had chosen to emulate the classical Western model, it would have promoted public infrastructure investment rather than privatizing it without price regulation. It would have continued subsidizing popular education and industry, and modernized its agriculture. It would not have given away land and mineral rights to insiders to sell off to foreigners to fuel a Western stock market boom. And it would not have closed down manufacturing and research, leading its skilled professionals to emigrate to the West to find work.

Instead of introducing Western-style checks and balances to modernize public spending and tax policy, Russia threw out the baby with the bathwater. Reflecting a loss of faith in government’s ability to function honestly and effectively, public functions were turned over to financial managers. Unfortunately, their scope tends to be short-term and extractive. No agency was charged with steering long-term capital investment and promoting rising living standards.

The former Soviet states did not set out to create a tax policy to make the economy more competitive by minimizing their cost of living and doing business. The greatest international variation in such costs today is for housing and debt service. The Soviet states could have turned over living and office spaces freely to their users in 1991, much as they gave away land and natural resources and public enterprises to managers. This would have provided initially debt-free housing and plant. The rental value of these sites could have served as the tax base, freeing the government from having to tax sales, labor and industry – just at the moment when Western economies were embarking on their debt-inflated real estate bubble.

But Russia and other post-Soviet countries did what the West economies were doing. They let bankers appropriate the rental value of land sites, turning “free lunch” rent into interest payments. Taxing employment and sales of consumer goods rather than land and natural resources obliged the post-Soviet economies to make their labor and industry higher-cost than was the case in countries relying more on property taxes and progressive income taxation.

Bankers and foreign investors got a bonanza from mortgage lending. Its basic principle is that “What the tax collector leaves ‘free’ is available for banks to turn into interest.” Buyers bid against each other for credit to buy properties, with the winner being whoever agrees to pay the most rental value to bankers. Families, foreign buyers and speculators pay this untaxed rental value as interest, leaving nothing available for the tax collector – while land prices rise, on credit.

The economic shrinkage resulting from this policy is applauded as a success story even in disaster zones such as neoliberalized Latvia – as if austerity, dismantling public enterprise, and taxing manufacturing and other employment rather than land and natural resources make economies more competitive. What actually happens is that labor is forced into debt to buy housing, education and other basic needs – or else, emigrate. Latvia reports a 10 percent drop in its population (from 2.2 million to 1.9 million) since its last census as adults seek work abroad.

Given a free hand in how to make Russia and its post-Soviet neighbors into their ideal, neoliberals promised that vesting a power elite of new billionaires by giving away national assets would make everyone richer. But instead, dismantling Russia’s public infrastructure and economic subsidies has spurred emigration and capital flight. This has not been a natural course of development. It is a distortion akin to the European colonialism achieved by military force prior to World War II, and the austerity programs imposed by the IMF and World Bank on Third World countries since the 1960s, achieved by foreign debt leverage. Without being subject to either of such threats, the post-Soviet economies imposed such programs on themselves voluntarily. The result is that instead of Russia receiving the aid that was expected, it transferred wealth abroad via emigration and capital flight to the West, while destruction of Soviet industry has made more fuel and minerals available for export to the West.

Proceeds went in the first instance to oligarchs, for whom Russian banks served as the pipeline through which an estimated $25 billion in flight capital flowed annually to the West for over a decade after 1991 – a quarter of a trillion dollars. Privatizers felt that their free lunch was more secure beyond clawback power of the government. And most important, they had more faith in Western growth than in post-Soviet opportunities. So for Western bankers, raw-materials investors and Cold Warriors, a de-industrialized Russia has been a success story – obtaining natural resources and asset ownership on the cheap while ending the old Soviet Union’s potential military rivalry. Russia’s giveaways made its stock market the world’s best performer, enriching U.S. and other investors from 1993-1997 (and recently once again). So Russia is producing a surplus for foreign investors and for its own large class of billionaires. In this respect Russian poverty finds its counterpart in an enormous transfer of wealth to foreigners and to domestic vested interests since 1990 – and a destruction of industrial wealth-creating capacity.

Although neoliberal policy advice to turn its economy into what American economists used to call a “hewer of wood and drawer of water” came from the West, it is not how Western nations organize their own economies. Rather, it is a money manager’s dream of how to extract natural resource rent and install tollbooths on infrastructure mainly to pay Western investors or for Russian investors to extract and send to the West as capital flight.

Russian poverty as a result of economic austerity ideology sponsored by the financial sector

Russia’s economic warping and emigration was unnecessary. The economy was self-sufficient in 1990, with a solvent (although inefficient) public sector. Russia started its conversion to neoliberal policy with one of the world’s most highly educated populations, above all in engineering and technology, computer science and other key skills. Families were secure in their housing (admittedly cramped). And most important, the economy was free of foreign debt, mortgage debt, education debt, credit card debt, corporate debt, urban and other public debt overhead, and. There was no rentier class to support – no absentee owners living off interest, dividends or property rents.

How then did so much of Russia’s population come to suffer poverty? How was manufacturing dismantled while natural resource wealth was monopolized – with much of its revenue sent abroad rather than used to upgrade economic infrastructure and capital formation?

The cost of educating people has long been the most productive investment that economies can make. But it is an expensive investment. Dismantling and privatizing public spending has priced higher education out of range for many people in post-Soviet countries. And the curriculum itself has been de-industrialized. Training people to make money by merely financial means rather than by engineering for industry and agricultural technology is as damaging as dismantling factories and equipment. The financialization of schooling and other public policy focus leaves the economy unbalanced and polarized, with many people out of work, able to maintain themselves only by running up debt – and ultimately by emigrating.

Russia’s problem is not that its economy is too unproductive to create prosperity. The problem now is how to develop a less pro-financial and polarized economy. This was the issue that inspired the classical idea of markets free of “unearned” financial overhead, land rent and monopoly rent. This Progressive Era approach – based on progressive taxation, especially of land – could and should have been Russia’s model in 1990.

Russia’s Achilles heel proved to be a lack of understanding of how financialization already was untracking Western industrial capitalism (having warped economies throughout the Third World). Russia’s leaders had lost faith in the Communist State without realizing that every economy is planned. There is more than one mode of planning – depending on which sectors control the state. Replacing the old state bureaucracy did not solve the problem of bad planning. It merely changed its character, shifting it to the banking sector and the new oligarchs most favored by their Western sponsors.

Russia’s poverty is unnecessary – and is the result of regressive financial and fiscal policy

Poverty in modern societies always is a result of the way economies are mis-planned. Throughout the West, planning has shifted out of the hands of governments to those of the banking and financial sector. This is euphemized as “free markets,” but it is merely markets free of public regulation against fraud and dishonesty, free of government taxation of rentier income – in short, markets free for rentiers, not free from them.

All economies are planned. The question is, who is to do the planning? When governments are stripped of this role, it passes to financial centers. The shift of planning to Wall Street, the City of London, the Paris Bourse and Frankfurt is more centralized today than government planning was feared to be. And whereas the scope of public planning at least in principle is to promote long-term capital investment and subsidize infrastructure, financial planning is short-term. The result turns out to be even more centralized than government planning – as well as by financial managers looking to their own short-term interest rather than to promote society’s long-term development and raise living standards for the population as a whole. The financial business plan is to create a loan market in the two largest asset categories of modern economies: real estate (mainly the value of land sites) and privatized infrastructure, as well as monopolies able to charge prices above their basic cost of production.

The resulting land rent and monopoly rent is paid interest out of the higher fees that privatization-on-credit entails. This enriches the financial sector by turning infrastructure charges into a flow of interest and dividends. As these charges rise, their payout raises stock market and real estate prices – largely by capitalizing the revenue into new debt leveraging. Financial managers leverage their own equity investment by taking on new debt (often to buy other firms or simply to payout as dividends) instead of recycling profits into new capital investment. Tangible capital formation in the means of production gives way to a proliferation of bank loans, bonds and stocks – financial claims on income and production.

Debt leveraging increases the return on equity – until the debt overhead shrinks markets, profits fall and companies go bankrupt, leaving empty corporate shells. But by the time this happens, financial managers take their money and run, keeping the enormous salaries and bonuses they have paid themselves – and looking for new worlds to conquer financially.

The economic agony may be prolonged by persuading governments to bail out the banks, subsidizing the financial house of cards. The pretense is that this will help wage earners keep their jobs. But this is only a populist pretext. The reality is that financialization involves a race to the bottom. It obliges families to pay more of their income as debt service, leaving less consumer demand to warrant new investment and hiring.

Instead of designing a mixed economy with public infrastructure for basic monopolies and taxing the site value of land that public investment in transportation and overall prosperity created, the Houston Summit explained that its aim was to “promote privatization of state property” (p. 12). But privatization without taxation is “free lunch” wealth. What followed was a travesty of the truly free market and tax reforms by which North America and Europe got rich during the 1890-1914 Progressive Era.

An identical pattern of de-industrialization, failed voucher schemes, “grabitization” followed by rising debt, poverty and emigration of skilled labor, has plagued the Baltics and other post-Soviet economies that took Western neoliberal advice. Latvia is the most extreme example – yet privatization lobbyists celebrate it even today as a success story, not as planning gone radically wrong. Even in Russia, the Right Forces party views Augusto Pinochet’s asset-stripping privatizations as a successful model. The reality is that by the end of the 1970s all the pension funds were looted by the kleptocratic grupos into bankruptcy. Chilean voters rejected this program as most of the population is now without pensions, free public education and other services available before the coup imposed privatization at gunpoint.

Guaranteed to fail: privatization without progressive taxation and regulation

When the Houston Summit acknowledged that “A process of spontaneous privatization is taking place in large sectors of industry,” there was no criticism of how this might prove damaging – no suggestion that managers might bleed their enterprises through short-term income maximization, debt leveraging, paying themselves the surplus and sending it abroad or outright looting rather than building up their tangible capital investment.

The new breed of financial managers in the West as well as in the former Soviet economies treat direct investment, research and development almost as donating charity to the future. And financial managers are not known for being charitable. That is the problem with financial management: It is short-term, hit and run, and extractive rather than productive. But rather than discouraging this financialization process and its concentration of wealth in ways that John Stuart Mill’s generation called the “unearned increment,” the Houston Report endorsed it (p. 26): “Rapid privatization would not only hasten the benefits of private ownership but can also yield revenue at a time when both the budget deficit and the monetary overhang need to be cut.” What was lacking was a discussion of the various ways available to privatize – and to shape markets by a tax system that encourages capital formation rather than rentier overhead.

Classical economists from the Physiocrats through Adam Smith, Mill, Marx and the Progressive Era reformers (the real reformers) dealt with how to do this in a free market to minimize the cost of production and cost of living. If privatization’s aim is to encourage new direct investment – and discourage “free lunch” speculation – then governments should tax “economic rent”: resource rent, land rent and monopoly rent. The revenue of privatized assets attributable to public investment (such as public transportation increasing real estate site rents) should be taxed on the same principle of taxing land and natural resources.

The Houston neoliberals rejected this idea, and urged Russia and other Soviet countries to do the opposite. Their aim was to not to turn them into viable competitors but to treat them as economic prey. Instead of teaching them to become as rich as the West – without corruption – the advice given to the individuals picked by Western advisors was just the opposite of how the West developed. It was to let the banks and financial insiders do the planning, not government.

Who has benefited most from privatization, neoliberal style: Russia, or the West?

Instead of helping Russia minimize its cost structure to make it more competitive, European as well as the U.S. advisors viewed it as a potential rival. Their aim was to turn the former Soviet states into customers for their exports, and especially for their bank credit rather than developing their own industrial banking systems. Western bank credit is created simply on computer keyboards that Russia and other financial systems easily could do just as well. But the Baltics, for instance, were treated a field for Scandinavian bank credit, while Hungary and Romania were dependent on Austrian banks. These foreign banks found the largest markets to be real estate, thanks to the fact that neoliberal advisors insisted on leaving land untaxed. The result was that initially low site values were “free” to be pledged to bankers as interest. The ensuing real estate bubble loaded down the post-Soviet economies with mortgage debt, ultimately leaving many families bankrupt.

The other major credit market consisted of the monopolies being privatized. Here too, neoliberals urged against anti-trust regulation, price regulation or progressive taxation. This left more monopoly rent to be extracted, and ultimately paid to bankers (mainly in the West). The post-Soviet economies were infested with tollbooth systems for predatory pricing rather than enjoying the price regulation that characterized the most successful Western economies.

The post-Soviet economies were to become complementarity to the West in their production and credit patterns, not competitive. The commodities that the West wanted from Russia were oil and gas, as well as minerals. And of course Western investors wanted to profit from ownership of these natural resources, by buying shares in their companies. Russia was not to tax resource rents, which would reduce dividend payouts to investors. So in contrast to the progressive taxation and focusing on land rent and other economic rent as “free lunch” income, Western advisors told the post-Soviet states to un-tax real estate and subsoil resources (ostensibly to “raise more money” when the state sold them off).

Neoliberal philosophy was to tax employment in industry and other sectors. The effect was to maximize the cost of living and producing goods and services – while depriving the government of its natural source of fiscal revenue in resource rents and monopoly rents. A secondary effect was to deprive the middle class of the ability to save. They could maintain basic living standards and obtain housing ownership or education only by running into debt.

This model led to dependency of the former Soviet states on the West, not to their development as equals. To be an “equal” is to be a rival, from the Western vantage point – not only an economic rival but also a potential military rival from the NATO perspective. All military power in modern times rests ultimately on industrial capability, and manufacturing was largely dismantled and scrapped throughout the Soviet Union.

The Harvard Boys played a similar role to that of the Chicago Boys in Pinochet’s Chile. Their program of shock therapy, currency depreciation and privatization had the effect of stripping assets and, in due course, making them available to U.S. and other Western investors. Directing governments not to tax the value of land, natural resources and public enterprises made their “free lunch” rent available to pay bankers and investors. Failure to collect these resource rents and windfall gains left this revenue to be capitalized into securities – while forcing the government to tax business and employment. The idea was to make the transfer of wealth irreversible – a transfer of resources to a relatively few individuals enamored with the West, transacted at so far below actual value (often virtually for free) that Russia became the world’s top stock-market performer for three years.

Some excellent economists and property assessors came over from the United States hoping to help Russia. Ted Gwartney proposed to make land-value maps of St. Petersburg, and Moscow so that these cities could collect the rental value as their major source of fiscal revenue. This would have kept housing prices low, by preventing site-value rents from being capitalized into bank loans. The land would have been privately owned, but the rental value that did not reflect new construction costs and other capital improvements would not have pledged to pay interest to banks for loans to load post-Soviet economies down with debt.

A bad tax policy that increases the cost of labor and capital

Neoliberal “value-free” doctrine holds that making income by real estate and natural resource speculation, lending at interest, financial trading and betting (and asset-price gains) is as helpful to the economy as tangible capital investment in the means of production. On this ground the Houston Summit rejected the classical economic principle that tax rates should differ “according to the nature of the income” (p. 21). Yet this was the aim of 19th-century free market theory – to free economies from rentier income in the form of land rent, monopoly rent and interest. Such revenue is an unearned payment to privilege, not technologically necessary.

To counter Mr. Gwartney’s work with Dmitri Lvov of the Russian Academy of Sciences and others, the World Bank and U.S. Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) explained that classical land taxation was not what they had in mind. The idea of rent and monopoly prices as things to be taxed or regulated to keep prices in line with cost-value was expurgated from the program. The aim was for Western investors to receive this economic rent, leaving Russian industry high-cost, highly taxed – and not subsidized.

The Houston Report claimed that capital investment would develop spontaneously as property was transferred into private hands – the quicker the better, even without payment being made and before any evaluation and economic reorganization took place. It acknowledged (p. 26): “Firms might be acquired at far below (or even far above) their actual values, and ownership might become concentrated in the hands of a relatively few individuals with money or connections. Moreover, the state’s productive assets are valued at a sum far in excess of the savings available to the private sector.” However, the report deemed it too “complicated” to do an assessment of what such a price would be. It recommended that, “for small enterprises, provision may need to be made for buyers to pay in installments.” But it did not make the obvious corollary proposal for larger companies to issue a small proportion (say, 5 or 10 percent of the shares) to set a market price, or to assess a fair price for the government to tax or receive for its property as operations were rationalized. The report advised Russia simply to give resources away quickly: “the prospective revenues from privatization should be forgone in the interests of speed and distributive equity.” But what it meant by distributive equity” was carefully avoided. The reality was that only Western investors were in a financial position to pay anywhere near a fair price.

Giving tax subsidy to Russian resources sold to the West on the cheap

The Report insisted that tax rates be slashed for wealthy investors, assuming that they are crooks and can get away with tax fraud, given incompetent governments unwilling to implement the tax code, in contrast to U.S. and Western European 20th-century experience. “The top marginal rate of 60 percent will deter taxpayer compliance, and the multiplicity of brackets will complicate administration.” Yet high progressive income tax rates went hand in hand with the strongest growth periods of the United States and Europe, especially for the middle class.

Favoring the top of the economic pyramid and the finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) sector, the Report advised that taxes on interest and other rentier income should be added only “over time” – implicitly after the economy was restructured along lines favorable to finance, real estate and mining fortunes. Most post-Soviet economies were deterred from taxing windfall gains or what U.S. authorities call “unexplained enrichment.” Yet the main way to make money in these deregulated economies was indeed to reap a windfall – selling the property a manager had obtained from the public domain, and indeed, selling part or even all one’s shares to foreigners, once domestic savings had been wiped out. Russia was to avoid a land tax or other taxes on windfall gains and property as ostensibly “value-free.”

In practice this meant a pro-financial VAT tax to establish “a broad and neutral revenue base.” But this is not neutral. It increases the cost of consumer goods and hence is anti-labor while not taxing property or lending. We see the result today most notoriously in Latvia, where employment bears a set of flat taxes amounting to 59%, while property taxes are just 1% of assessed value – with no land-value maps to guide assessors.

So when post-Soviet Russia started with a clean slate in 1991 – with no debt, and with ownership passing into private hands at perhaps 1 percent of real value – the benefit of being debt-free and rent-free was not used as the basis of a Russian industrial renaissance. The nation’s vast resources and their potential income were transferred to Western investors at a fraction of their value – giving a profit to Russian sellers but still leaving enough room to enable the shares to soar in dollarized markets as Russia refrained from taxing the windfall.

Neoliberals applaud this as a success story. It has indeed been a success for the West. But Russia’s economy has received only a small portion of the value of the assets it relinquished. The policy has made many Russian billionaires, as the Forbes list documents each year. But much of the economy remains in poverty.

Summary

Banking today finds its market in lending against economic “free lunch” rentier income – debt service paid out of real estate rents and privileged opportunities to engage in monopoly price gouging. Tangible new capital formation is funded out of retained earnings (and to some extent, new stock offerings). Even this corporate cash flow is now being bled to pay interest and dividends, and to spend on stock buy-backs to “add value” to the stock options that financial managers give themselves.

This dysfunctional financial philosophy has de-industrialized the U.S. and European economies and now is pushing them into depression. So Russia’s problem and that of its fellow BRICS countries is how to protect themselves from having to rely on shrinking financialized markets in what used to be the world’s industrial core nations. They henceforth must depend increasingly on their own domestic market growth – which means rising living standards at home.

The European Union has followed the bad advice that the IMF imposed on Third World countries from the 1960s through 1980s, for governments to balance their budgets and international payments by imposing austerity. Fiscal austerity takes the form of heavily taxing consumers and selling off public assets and infrastructure to buyers – who turn around and pay interest and dividends their bankers and stockholders by levying tolls and other access fees. Financial austerity consists of tightening bank credit and raising interest rates to induce borrowing abroad, on the myth that foreign bank loans are inherently more productive.
These austerity policies have not helped economies grow. Latin America, Latvia and now Greece exemplify the waste of economic potential from following neoliberal anti-labor impoverishment as official policy. It slows growth, making economies less competitive and weaker – and more dependent on foreign creditors as domestic markets stagnate and the most employable individuals emigrate.

So the main task at hand is to develop a policy to spur a thriving domestic market, by elevating low-income families to become an economic resource rather than a burden.

APPENDIX

How much poverty is the result of bad economic policy?

Just as there are many ways to get rich, there are various kinds of poverty. It therefore is necessary to distinguish between how much poverty is “economically” justified and how much is unnecessary. The good news is that much of today’s poverty does not stem from technological or other “objective” causes such as low productivity. Rather, it is the result of special interests monopolizing the economic surplus at the expense of the economy at large, carving out privileges to extract income without any technologically necessary cost of production. Their way of getting rich is by what the classical economists called “rent seeking.” It is an economically unnecessary burden – and one from which the classical economists sought to free society. The idea of a “free market” from the Physiocrats and Adam Smith down through John Stuart Mill and the 19th century socialists was to free industrial capitalism from the rentier class that itself was a carry-over from Europe’s feudal epoch.

The main rentiers are the financial class, landowners and natural resource owners at the top of the economic pyramid ownership of “tollbooths”: land, mineral rights, or basic monopolies and banks with the public privilege to create credit. It is to these rentiers that the bottom 90% are indebted and must pay interest, rent, user fees and other access charges. And neoliberals defending this state of affairs turn the classical idea of free markets upside down. Their idea of “free” markets is one free from government price regulation, taxes on land rent, monopoly rent, financial interest and other categories of what the classical economists called “unearned income.”

So we find ourselves with two opposing ideas of what constitutes a free market. The classical idea is to grow by avoiding extractive forms of wealth seeking at society’s expense. The neoliberal alternative to centralized planning is to dismantle the government’s ability to regulate markets to steer growth and shape markets in the national interest. The effect of this dismantling is to centralize planning in the hands of bankers – primarily those of Wall Street and the City of London, followed by financial interests in satellite economies.

The success of the vested interests – absentee owners, monopolists and the bankers that finance them – is the main cause of economic polarization and poverty in today’s world. These rentiers have bought enough control of politics to obtain tax favoritism to subsidize their rent-seeking “toll booth” economy on credit, with interest being ruled tax deductible in contrast to direct equity investment.

Neoliberal economists endorse as if it were a natural way for economies to grow. But their concept of “wealth creation” takes the form of financial riches and special privileges, inflated in price by debt leveraging on the premise that an asset is worth whatever banks will lend against it, by capitalizing collateral into an interest-bearing loan. This financial concept of wealth is something quite different from tangible wealth in the form of actual means of production, education and skills, research and technology as most people have long thought of wealth. Yet this mode of wealth seeking has become the major threat to national economic growth today, by dysfunctional taxes favoring special interests at the expense of the economy at large. This fiscal philosophy reflects a failure to draw the classical distinction between productive and unproductive investment and credit.

The wealthy justify their status claiming to invest in building up the stock of capital, employing more labor in the process. Economic textbooks depict them as growing rich by investing in economic growth. Corporate profits are depicted as being re-invested in new plant and equipment, raising productivity. Credit is supposed to finance investment that will generate enough income to pay off loans with interest, leaving a profit over for entrepreneurs and their stockholders.

Business schools and the lobbying tanks endowed by the wealthy depict them as wise managers of companies run by industrial engineers. But in reality it is easier to make money by predatory means. That is how the railroad land barons and Wall Street trust builders and stock market manipulators made the great American fortunes. Their monopolies fought against labor unionization and the drive for safer and better working conditions, raising prices without regard for costs.

This kind of behavior inspired social democratic reforms to shape markets in ways that would raise all levels of society. Immigrants to America arrived poor, but were given schooling, health and social-work assistance to provide the mobility to rise. This enriched the whole economy by what was called the Economy of High Wages. Rising wages were self-justifying by being a precondition for rising labor productivity, thanks to the fact that well-educated, well-fed and well-clothed and housed labor was more productive.

The vested interests broke away from the classical economics that powered this takeoff. The post-classical break occurred mainly over the treatment of all income and wealth as deemed to be “earned.” There is no recognition of unearned wealth achieved at other peoples’ expense, as what technically is merely a transfer function. It is in this spirit that the neoliberal Chicago economist Milton Friedman claimed that: “There is no such thing as a free lunch.” This “value-free” logic rejects not only Marx but also Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and other classical economists. Every way of getting rich is deemed to be “productive” in proportion to the wealth it creates at the top of the economic pyramid.

Why the gap between the rich and poor is growing

The U.S. and European economies are more and more about how to get a free lunch – on credit. This has led to a post-industrial form of economic polarization. If industrial firms still got rich by squeezing out more profits to invest in capital, this at least would increase employment. But when wealth is concentrated by financial means – and by buying property rights and privileges on credit – the gains are paid out as interest and dividends. These financial payments crowd out industrial profits. This explains why the financial sector has increased its share of reported profits in the U.S. national income and product accounts (NIPA) to 40 percent by2010.

Both globally and within nations, economies are buckling under the attempt to pay debts that have grown beyond the reasonable ability to pay. On the global level the wealth and income gap is widening between creditor nations and debtor countries (most recently Ireland and Greece). Domestically, polarization also is increasing mainly between creditors and debtors – that is, between the financial sector and the rest of the economy. Debt service absorbs most of the surplus: corporate profits, real estate rents, personal income over and above basic needs, and even government revenues over and above necessary public maintenance charges. Financial analysts abbreviate this as ebitda: earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. And banks and other financial institutions recycle most of their revenue to make yet more loans – to extract yet more interest and fees, until finally the economy buckles in poverty.

The financial sector today thus plays the role that Ricardo, Adam Smith and the Physiocrats assigned to landlords in absorbing the industrial surplus. The financial bubble raised the price of housing, forcing buyers to take on a lifetime of mortgage debt, paying out the rental income as interest. Rising educational fees are financed by student loans. In the United States these debts cannot be wiped out via bankruptcy. Many students took on debt that will take a number of decades to pay off – without regard for their ability to earn income.

The financial sector also funds corporate takeovers. In fact, most industrial companies are now run by Chief Financial Officers, not industrial engineers or even salesmen. The aim is not to create wealth by new direct investment but by downsizing and outsourcing, by living from short run to short run – and in the end by asset stripping to pay bankers and bondholders who finance the game.

This is the mentality of the neoliberals who arrived to advise Russia in the 1990s. They did not come to exploit labor by hiring it to squeeze out surplus value. They didn’t want much to do with employment at all. They wanted control of raw materials resources on the cheap. They wanted to help leading scientists and industrial engineers emigrate to America, because its schools are producing mainly financial graduates, not technology-oriented students.

Financial polarization has been catalyzed by fiscal polarization. Since the 1980s the tax burden has been shifted off the higher wealth brackets onto the bottom 80% of the population. Taxes on real estate and financial gains were slashed to a fraction of income tax rates, while Social Security and Medicare were treated as “user fee” programs, paid for in advance by employees (up to a $102,000 cut-off point), providing the government with enough revenue to cut taxes on wealth. The result is an anti-progressive tax system. And it is most steeply regressive in the former Soviet states (led by Latvia’s race to the bottom).

While average wage levels drifted downward in the United States since the late 1970s, the tax and debt burdens have risen, increasing the cost of obtaining housing, an education and medical care. Debt deflation is now shrinking markets for goods and services, leaving the U.S. economy in a deep L-shaped recession/depression, with Western Europe close in pursuit. Populations are being squeezed and getting poorer. This obviously is not a good model for Russia and other post-Soviet economies to follow. To avoid being dragged down, they must reject the neoliberal financial and tax philosophy they were given in the 1990s.

How to reverse economic polarization and poverty

The most obvious cause of poverty is over-indebtedness. The largest category of personal debt in today’s world is mortgage debt to obtain a family home. The debt burden is aggravated by the tax shift off finance, real estate and monopolies onto employees and consumers. Housing prices rise when taxes are shifted off property onto employment and consumers, because this tax shift leaves more rental value for new buyers to pledge to banks for mortgage loans. The winning bidder is whoever agrees to pay the most of this rental value as interest. So the banks end up with the rent. This is why the financial sector has grown so rich while debtors have little remaining to spend on goods and services. So markets shrink and economies fall into recession.

This financial-fiscal problem can be solved by following what classical economists recommended: taxing away “free lunch” income – land rent, monopoly rent and other returns to special privilege – while keeping natural monopolies in the public domain to provide services at subsidized rates or freely, as in the case of roads, water and sewer systems and the like.

The high point of land taxation in England occurred when William the Conqueror ordered the Domesday Book to be compiled. The idea was for land ownership to be the tax base. But landlords fought to “free” themselves of this tax, ultimately forcing governments to tax labor and industry by sales and income taxes. Lower property taxes “freed” the land’s rent to be pledged to the banks for mortgage loans. So higher land taxes actually keep down the price of housing, office building and other debt-financed rent-yielding assets. The tax shift off these assets has had a negative impact on the production-and-consumption economy, by raising the cost of housing, living and doing business. This makes neoliberalized economies less competitive internationally – and hence, poorer.

Cutting taxes on the higher wealth and income brackets leads to budget deficits, which financial lobbyists urge governments to rectify by imposing austerity programs. This is the fiscal philosophy that the IMF and other Washington Consensus agencies have imposed. It prompts a “Take the money and run” strategy by the financial interests to bail out, moving their money abroad. This capital flight hurts national economies in the long run.

The manner in which privatization has been handled (without price regulation, and with tax deductibility for interest payments and “fictitious” offshore charges) is an additional cause of polarization that undercuts competitiveness. American business economists of the late 19th century explained that the nation could become more competitive by treating public infrastructure as what Simon Patten called a “fourth factor of production” alongside labor, capital and land. Its “return” does not take the form of income (wages, profits or rent), but rather the degree to which it lowers the national price structure.

By contrast, privatization in a financialized fiscal regime adds pseudo-cost overhead to the economy. These technologically unnecessary costs are headed by interest charges on credit borrowed to buy public assets, high payments to management, and stock options. Privatizers then install “toll booths” across the economy to extract economic rent.

U.S. economic strategists have long realized this. Back in 1944-46 when the IMF and World Bank were being formed, the Soviet economy was excluded because Western planners feared that its economy was free of the rent and interest charges that “free market” economies permitted. The opposition to Soviet membership was that its debt-free, interest-free and tax-free structure gave its industry an “unfair” advantage over market economies being financialized.

The advice given by the West to Russia since 1991 has led to maximizing the financial, real estate and monopoly overhead from which classical economists sought to free society, treating these rentier charges as unnecessary overhead to be reformed. It was by such Progressive Era reforms that Western economies rose to dominance. Russia and other countries can now take this path of reform to shape more efficient, fair and prosperous economies. In sum, now that neoliberal financial lobbyists have turned Progressive Era reforms upside down, it is necessary to “reform the reformers” in order for Russia to rebuild its economy in the way that made the U.S. and Western Europe so successful during their economic takeoffs.

From the Enlightenment to the flowering of classical political economy into Marxism in Europe and institutional analysis in America, the aim of economics was to free economies from such unnecessary overhead. This is the body of reform that led the Progressive Era to guide public investment and tax policy in the national interest and steer industrial development to raise labor productivity. Keynesian economics subsequently sought to stabilize economies with public spending in the context of “euthanasia of the rentier.”

By contrast, today’s neoliberal lobbying efforts lead to economic shrinkage and to a redistribution of wealth and income to the rentier classes. This strategy involves disabling government power, while denying the classical distinctions between productive and unproductive (parasitic) investment, credit and modes of wealth seeking.

Ultimately, the wealth of any nation is its population. It is wasteful to reduce families to poverty. The aim should be to make them more productive. The economy is an overall system, which requires a regulatory and tax structure to steer wealth-seeking in ways that add to national output, not merely to benefit the rich (or foreign investors) at the expense of the poor.

Footnotes

[1] This advice is summarized in a joint report by the IMF, IBRD, OECD and EBRD: The Economy of the USSR. A study undertaken to a request by the Houston Summit. Summary and Recommendations. December 19, 1990. I refer to it in this paper as the Houston Report.


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